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Abstract 
 
Technological neutrality in law is, roughly, the idea that law should 
not pick technological winners and losers, that law should neither 
help nor hinder particular types of technological artefacts. It has 
become a pervasive idea in technology law and politics in the West 
and now forces itself upon the World Trade Organization as a 
means of preventing China from regulating its territorial Internet. 
This paper examines the idea of technological neutrality for both its 
internal coherence and its relationship with the dominant politico-
philosophical traditions of our time – the liberal and the Confucian. 
In doing so, the paper points at how liberalism itself has been 
transformed in contemporary societies, the role that information and 
communication technologies play in this transformation and shows 
how technological neutrality threatens at the same time the 
developments of contemporary liberalism and liberalism’s 
reconciliation with the Confucian value system. The paper invites 
us to question technological neutrality through its relations with 
political neutrality, a doctrine that has lost significant grounds in 
contemporary liberal philosophy post-communitarian critique and 
which is fundamentally opposed to the ethico-political traditions of 
Chinese societies. On an applied level, the paper invites us to 
abandon ideas of neutrality in technology law and politics in 
general and, in particular, provides a hopefully compelling 
argument for China to resist attempts to neutralize its value system 
and nation-building project through the system of international 
trade. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1936067
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The Neutralization of Harmony 
The Problem of Technological Neutrality, East and West 
 
Marcelo Thompson† 
 
 
“But there was a stillness about Ralph as he sat that marked 
him out: there was his size, and attractive appearance; and 
most obscurely, yet most powerfully, there was the conch. 
The being that had blown that, had sat waiting for them on 
the platform with the delicate thing balanced on his knees, 
was set apart. “Him with the shell” “Ralph! Ralph!” “Let 
him be chief with the trumpet-thing”.1 
 
 
“Scientists, artists, look with the eye of genius at the 
present state of the human mind; you will see that the 
sceptre of public opinion has fallen into your hand; grasp it 
with vigour”. 2 (…) “[N]o more honours for the Alexanders; 
long live the Archimedes”.3
 
 
                                                                                       
† Research / Assistant Professor, The University of Hong Kong Faculty 
of Law. D.Phil. Candidate, University of Oxford; LL.M., University of 
Ottawa. Early drafts of this paper have been presented at the 2010 Annual 
PKU-HKU Law Conference, held at Peking University, and the Legal 
Theory Workshops held at The University of Hong Kong. I am glad to 
acknowledge helpful and detailed comments by Scott Veitch in both those 
opportunities and also by Anne Cheung, Puja Kapai, Victoria Nash, Sun 
Haochen, Marco Wan, Xu Yan and Ron Yu. A final draft of the paper was 
presented at the Jurisprudence Section of the Society of Legal Scholars 
Annual Conference 2011, held at the University of Cambridge. I thank 
Noam Gur, James Lee, Richard Mullender and other participants of that 
Section for their helpful comments on my presentation. 
1. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES 30 (1954). 
2. Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon, Letters from an 
Inhabitant of Geneva to his Contemporaries (1803) reproduced in 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SAINT-SIMON 72 (Valence Ionescu trans., Ghita 
Ionescu ed., 1976). 
3. Saint-Simon, cited in GEOFFREY HAWTHORN, ENLIGHTENMENT AND 
DESPAIR: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THEORY 69 (1987 2
nd
 ed). 
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I. REWIRING NEUTRALITY 
 
There is much that the information environment can teach us 
about liberalism and its core tenets in the 21st century. In the 
lines that follow, we will focus on one of the central elements 
of 20th century liberal political theory – the doctrine of 
political neutrality – which has now been recast in dimensions 
perhaps unprecedented in the history of political ideas. The 
way it has been so has to do with a market-oriented ideology 
that is based as much on a shrunk-pragmatic
4
 understanding 
of the political as on an approach to the technological that 
mirrors such understanding. While the first foundation is 
certainly not distinctive of 21st century neutrality, the second 
is its cornerstone. It is such a technological semblance that has 
enabled the doctrine of political neutrality to reach entirely 
new dimensions in contemporary Western societies – 
dimensions, these, which now attempt to impinge upon the 
value systems of the East. 
 The technological, in a new configuration,
5
 has 
become the central domain of thought of the 21st century. In 
the West, it is the domain in which the political finds refuge – 
                                                                                       
4. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM 
UNBOUND 1 (2007) (“Pragmatism has become the philosophy of the age 
by shrinking. (...) As we have lost confidence in large projects, whether of 
theory or of politics, we have been taught how to live without them rather 
than how to recover and remake them in other, more promising forms”). 
5. That the technological has become the central domain of thought of 
our age could be seen as just the outcome of a long historical process 
rather than a matter of sheer revolution. Such is the process eloquently 
depicted by Carl Schmitt, in which what may at first appear as a mere 
quantitative unfolding turns into a qualitative shift. See Carl Schmitt, The 
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (Matthias Kozen & John P. 
McCormick trans.), in CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 80 
(George Schwab trans., Chicago University Press 2d ed. 2007) (1996). 
Human evolution, however, has always involved our attempt to master the 
world through the use of technological artefacts. In this view, which is the 
one I adopt in this article, what characterizes our time is not only the 
centrality of the technological but a paradigmatically new configuration of 
it. 
4   
 
 
 
in which decisions on good and evil, friend and enemy are 
conveniently evaded, seeming to reflect the ultimate 
realization of a way of thinking noted by Carl Schmitt already 
in 1929: 
“The evidence of the widespread contemporary belief 
in technology is based only on the proposition that the 
absolute and ultimate neutral ground has been found in 
technology, since apparently there is nothing more 
neutral. Technology serves everyone, just as radio is 
utilized for news of all kinds or as the postal service 
delivers packages regardless of their contents, since its 
technology can provide no criterion for evaluating 
them. Unlike theological, metaphysical, moral, and 
even economic questions, which are forever debatable, 
purely technical problems have something refreshingly 
factual about them. They are easy to solve, and it is 
easily understandable why there is a tendency to take 
refuge in technicity from the inextricable problems of 
all other domains”.6 
Political scepticism now walks pari passu with, if it does not 
ensue from, the fascination of society with the technological.
7
 
And as the technological pervades all dimensions of life in 
society so does the expectation of state restraint with regard to 
the technological. A principle that commands so, the principle 
                                                                                       
6. Id. at 90-91. 
7 . A series of surveys conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute, 
University of Oxford has shown that levels of trust of society in Internet-
related technological actors are significantly higher (39%) than those of 
trust in newspapers (28%) and other major corporations (30%), and almost 
twice as high as those of trust in the Government (20%). An ascendant 
trend with regard to trust in Internet-related actors has been consistent 
throughout the last 7 years. See Grant Black, Trust on the Internet Now 
Exceeds Trust in Other Major Institutions, OXIS: OXFORD INTERNET 
SURVEYS BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010), http://goo.gl/6VhWW. See also WILLIAM 
H. DUTTON, ELLEN J. HELSPER & MONICA M. GERBER, THE INTERNET IN 
BRITAIN: 2009. OXFORD INTERNET INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 32 
(2009) (UK), available at http://goo.gl/FvoeR. 
2011] THE NEUTRALIZATION OF HARMONY 5 
 
 
of technological neutrality, has become the touchstone of 
Western law and policy making in the information age, 
elevating neutrality to heights it had never reached before. 
Now, through the silk roads of international trade
8
 and the 
planetary avenues of international human rights, neutrality 
attempts to force itself into political traditions where restraint, 
even if exercised in the ethical life, has never led to the 
insulation of the political from the ethical – nor of the 
technological from either. 
 Having been invoked before in a number of contexts, 
in 2004 the principle of technological neutrality transcended 
its prior contextual references and was exported to the world 
stage as a cross-cutting ideal of technology law and politics. It 
was so as the General Assembly of the United Nations 
endorsed the Geneva Declaration of Principles,
9
 approved in 
the Geneva Round of the World Summit of the Information 
society. In that Declaration, participants from 175 countries 
around the world
10
 firmed their understanding that “the rule of 
law, accompanied by a supportive, transparent, pro-
competitive, technologically neutral and predictable policy 
                                                                                       
8. See Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 281 (2009) 
(welcoming the idea of technological neutrality in trade in what he calls 
“the electronic silk road”). See infra, n. 141, 142, 145 and accompanying 
text for a discussion. 
9. G.A. Res. 59/220, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/220 (Dec. 22, 2004) 
(“The General Assembly [...] Endorses the Declaration of Principles and 
the Plan of Action adopted by the Summit on 12 December 2003”). 
10 . First Phase, Geneva: The Summit, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY (Mar. 31, 2009), 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/index.html (“At the Geneva Phase of WSIS 
nearly 50 Heads of state/government and Vice-Presidents, 82 Ministers, 
and 26 Vice-Ministers and Heads of delegation as well as high-level 
representatives from international organizations, private sector, and civil 
society provided political support to the WSIS Declaration of Principles 
and Plan of Action that were adopted on 12 December 2003. More than 
11,000 participants from 175 countries attended the Summit and related 
events”). 
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and regulatory framework reflecting national realities, is 
essential for building a people-centred Information Society”.11 
 Most recently, and most centrally for the purposes of 
this article, the principle of technological neutrality has been 
resorted to before the World Trade Organization by a number 
of Western countries, in particular the United States, as a 
means of preventing China from carrying out specific 
regulatory initiatives for its territorial Internet. We discuss 
such an attempt in Part IV. 
 What technological neutrality really means is far from 
clear. Ultimately, there is no sense in which such a principle 
holds good – and thus it is only nominally that I refer to it 
along this article as a principle. None the less, amongst 
possible formulations,
12
 that which would cast technological 
neutrality under the best lights would go like this: 
P: Law should neither help nor hinder a particular type 
of technology; 
P1: as a necessary condition of P, law should 
be framed in terms of functions and values, not 
of technology itself. 
P, which I will call the non-discrimination principle, is the 
general proposition of technological neutrality. It is in this or 
other very similar enunciations that the principle of 
technological neutrality appears in the vast majority of law 
and policy instruments that affirm it. However, because it is 
unclear how law can achieve the non-discrimination ideal, a 
second proposition P1 is needed. This second proposition, 
which I will call the vagueness principle, directs the law to 
higher degrees of abstraction with regard to technological 
artefacts involved in social relations it regulates. In short, the 
vagueness principle commands law not to describe the 
specificities of technological artefacts. 
                                                                                       
11 . Geneva Declaration of Principles, WSIS, ¶ 49, Doc. WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003) (emphasis added). 
12. We enlarge on these formulations in Part II infra. 
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 There is no academic nit-picking in focusing on 
explaining and confronting these propositions. Nor are these 
extraneous, localized problems of technology-related stuff. 
Rather, I believe, they are the central regulatory concerns of 
our time. Not that they deserve this standing, for they have 
won it furtively, while we were all asleep at the ever receding 
banks of our political consciousness. Yet, there they are, 
sailing in their steep contradictions, challenging the overall 
projects of any form of virtue-oriented politics one can 
conceive of – West and East. As the technological becomes 
the central domain of thought of our time, as law and politics 
threaten to defer to the technological on the guise of not 
discriminating it, the normative order loses the opportunity of 
translating the technological with humanizing lenses. And by 
excluding such an increasingly important dimension of our 
personal realities, law ceases being, as it has been said to be, 
something “used by people to understand themselves”.13 
 It is thus essential that jurisprudence and political 
theory take the reins of this process that has so far happened 
largely in their spite – and which is widely incompatible with 
much of their contemporary orientations. In the pages that 
follow, I will offer a modest, initial contribution on the 
problem of technological neutrality that points in such a 
direction. I start in Part II with a rough discussion of the 
descriptive contours of the vagueness principle and an 
evaluation of its specific normative shortcomings. Here my 
focus will be on the internal incoherence of technological 
neutrality. I will question whether technological neutrality, in 
its more specific proposition (the vagueness principle) can 
pull itself together as an idea that makes any modicum of 
sense. In Part III, I will broaden the discussions on 
                                                                                       
13. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE 
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 237 (1994) (“‘[T]he law’ is a concept 
used by people to understand themselves. We are not free to pick on any 
fruitful concepts. It is a major task of legal theory to advance our 
understanding of society by helping us understand how people understand 
themselves”). 
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technological neutrality towards an external, more interesting 
perspective. I will focus on the overall problem of trying to 
reconcile technological neutrality with both contemporary 
liberal politics and the philosophical foundations of 
Confucian-oriented societies on which the principle of 
technological neutrality presently seeks to impinge. I will 
explain why such an attempt fails. While technological 
neutrality reflects a 21
st
 century version of neutralist liberal 
theory, such is a version fundamentally incompatible with any 
form of society we now live in – if yet it has ever been 
compatible with any other. Part IV concludes. 
II. VAGUENESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS 
 
There are a number of reasons for supporting vagueness, it is 
thought. One is the intent to future-proof the law against the 
normative perturbations brought about by technological 
change. The mobility of technological artefacts across ever 
unfolding sets of categories raises a permanent threat of 
disconnection
14
 between the institutions of law and the 
normative reality that law seeks to stabilize.
15
 Vagueness thus 
                                                                                       
14 . See ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE 
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 160-184 (2008), for a thoughtful discussion 
on what he calls the “challenge of regulatory connection”. 
15. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 142-172 (Klaus 
A. Ziegert transl.; Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David Schiff & 
Rosamund Ziegert eds., 2004), explaining that what functionally 
differentiates the law from other social systems is its being a time-binding 
mechanism that promotes the stabilization of normative expectations. 
Time-binding reduces the prospects of systemic risk. It does so since, as 
noted by Nobles and Schiff, rules provide general solutions which 
“support expectations about what, in the future, will be coded 
legal/illegal”. This thus dispenses law from the need of “provid[ing] a 
‘point to point’ defence to every potential conflict” (Richard Nobles and 
David Schiff, Introduction to NIKLAS LUHMANN, id. at 48). Adopting 
Luhmann’s perspective, we can see that where there is no stabilization of 
expectations involving extremely important components of our normative 
order, such as those related to technologies now unquestionably are, risk 
will have thrived and law will have failed to live up to its function. It is 
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responds with the pretence that by moving towards always 
higher degrees of abstraction law will be less susceptible to 
technological variation. Such sort of reasoning is problematic, 
if only because it works against law’s function of mediating 
between different reasons for action – that which Joseph Raz 
calls the service conception of authority,
 16
 with regard to 
matters of technological nature. As the mediating function of 
law rests eroded, and though vagueness may be of contextual 
value,
17  
one is prompted to ask whether it makes sense to 
affirm vagueness as a general principle of law in lieu of more 
granular and situated forms of legal craftsmanship.
18
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
indeed difficult to visualize how stable expectations can become where 
vagueness is pursued as a principle with regard to such a pervasive 
dimension of the facts on which expectations are grounded. 
16. In Joseph Raz's “service conception of authority”, the authority of 
law stems from the service it provides in “mediating between people and 
the right reasons which apply to them”. Joseph Raz, supra note 14 at 214. 
17. Vagueness does serve many functions. For instance, as Spence and 
Endicott note, vagueness avoids the occasional arbitrariness or 
impossibility of precision. It also enables different modalities of private 
ordering or delegation of power. See Timothy Endicott & Michael Spence, 
Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright, 121 L.Q.R. 657 2005 (UK). One can 
thus agree with Endicott that “[f]ar from being repugnant to the idea of 
making a norm, vagueness is of central importance to lawmakers (and 
other persons who craft normative texts). It is a central technique of 
normative texts: it is needed in order to pursue the purposes of formulating 
such texts”. Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in VAGUENESS IN 
NORMATIVE TEXTS 27-28 (Vijay K. Bathia, Jan Engberg, Maurizio Gotti & 
Dorothee Heller eds. 2005) (emphasis added). 
18 . Commenting on an important case in English copyright law 
(Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd, [2000] UKHL 58, 
[2001] 1 All ER 700), Endicott and Spence criticize the excessive 
vagueness of standards set by the House of Lords for defining, inter alia, 
which ideas, once expressed, are worthy of protection by copyright. 
According to the authors, the decision of the Law Lords did “nothing to 
control the vagueness of [the ideas-expression] dichotomy by giving any 
clue as to what should count as unprotected ideas and what should count 
as protectable expression” (id. at 672). In the authors’ views, the decision 
did not pay “due regard to the purposes for which copyright protection is 
afforded at all” and thus to the notion that “[t]he scope of copyright ought 
to reflect its justification” (id.) (emphasis added). This illustrates well that, 
10   
 
 
 
 This same challenge to a general principle of 
vagueness can be posed to the second assumed reason for 
supporting it, and which is more directly related to our 
venture in this paper: the notion that only by drafting laws and 
policies in ways that do not describe the specific properties of 
technological artefacts will states be able to stick to the non-
discrimination principle. The vagueness principle seeks to 
ensure that the words of the law do not get expressed in terms 
which are only reflexive of the properties of one or more 
technological artefacts – and thus that law does not help or 
hinder artefacts, or sets thereof, whose properties it reflects in 
its words. A major problem with this is precisely that of what 
is meant by not framing the law in terms of technology itself. 
The soundest way of expressing this is the one put forward in 
P1 – i.e. that law should be framed in terms of the functions19 
of technological artefacts (of the virtualization
20
 of future 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
however one may recognize the contingent value of vagueness, the extent 
of it – vis-à-vis the granularity of law – must hinge on how law should be 
conceived of to uphold the values it needs to uphold. 
19. See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE 
WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. SALES NO. E.02.V.8 (2001), available at 
http://goo.gl/idXtd (noting that, during the development of its Model Law 
on Electronic Signatures, “it was widely felt that focusing on the functions 
typical of PKI [a particular kind of infrastructure on which electronic 
signatures can be based] and not on any specific model might make it 
easier to develop a fully media-neutral rule at a later stage” (para. 20) 
(emphasis added). Media neutrality was used throughout the document by 
UNCITRAL in a way complementary to technological neutrality, meaning 
the non-discrimination amongst different technological media (here, paper 
or electronic form). However, one should also notice that, in UNCITRAL’s 
view, a fully media-neutral rule would not describe even the functions of 
technologies – which begs the question of what would a media-neutral 
framework describe, then...). 
20. As Pierre Lévy explains, “[v]irtualization can be defined as the 
movement of actualization in reverse. It consists in the transition from the 
actual to the virtual, an exponentiation of the entity under consideration”. 
PIERRE LÉVY, BECOMING VIRTUAL: REALITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 26 
(Robert Bononno trans., Basic Books 1998). 
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actual effects these may bring about) and of the values
21
 that 
law seeks to uphold in regulating those artefacts. 
 Some would claim that technological neutrality is 
about ensuring that law has neutral effects upon technologies 
or technological markets, rather than being a matter of 
wording.
22
 However, technological neutrality is a matter of 
wording;
23
 it is in the explicitly articulated rules of the 
                                                                                       
21 . See Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation be Technology-
Neutral?, in STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION: DECONSTRUCTING 
PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops, Miriam Lips, 
Corien Prins & Maurice Schellekens eds., T.M.C. Asser Press IT & Law 
Series, Vol. 9, 2006) (NL) (“[R]ather than put all effort into creating 
specific regulations for specific problems, a legal framework may also be 
established that outlines the main substantive principles that are at stake. 
Such a framework would, for instance, indicate the fundamental rights and 
values that are at stake and the rationale that underlies areas of 
regulation”). 
22 . See, e.g., Ulrich Kamecke & Torsten Korber, Technological 
Neutrality in the EC Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications: a Good Principle Widely Misunderstood, 29:5 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 330, 332 (2008) (UK) (claiming 
that “[a]s a substantive prohibition of discriminatory practices, 
[technological neutrality] is understood as pertaining to effects. The 
principle is therefore directed against substantive distortions of 
competition calling for a more economic approach to regulation policy”). 
See also Chris Reed, Taking Sides in Technological Neutrality, 4:3 
SCRIPT-ed 264, 267 (2007) (noting the “need ... to recognise that 
technologically neutral rules addressing the same issue may well differ in 
their wording and content, in order to achieve the same (or at least broadly 
equivalent) effects when applied to these technologies”; in order to 
“achieve a functionally equivalent treatment for each technology”). 
23. See e.g. Dow Jones and Company Inc. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 
575, 630-631 (Austl.) (claiming that “[g]enerally speaking, it is 
undesirable to express a rule of the common law in terms of a particular 
technology” (…) “Rules should be technology-neutral: Whilst the Internet 
does indeed present many novel technological features, it also shares many 
characteristics with earlier technologies that have rapidly expanded the 
speed and quantity of information distribution throughout the world”) 
(emphasis added). See also Robertson v. Thomson Corp, [2006] SCC 43, 
paras. 74, 75 (Can.) (“[L]ike its American counterpart, Canada’s Copyright 
Act is media neutral: the right is to reproduce the work in ‘any material 
form whatever’. ... The concept of media neutrality is how Parliament 
12   
 
 
 
normative order that the effects of technological neutrality are 
felt – for what technological neutrality does is to exclude 
reasons of technological nature from an important dimension 
of practical reasoning, which is that of the reasons provided 
by law. Here, in thinking about what to chose and do, one will 
be left with no directives given by legal rules if not in matters 
concerned with the functions
24
 of technological artefacts (or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
chose to come to grips with potential technological developments.  On its 
face, the media neutrality protection found in s. 3(1) is a simple concept.  
As Gonthier J. pointed out in Théberge, s. 3(1) offers ‘an appropriate and 
carefully worded recognition that a work may be reproduced even if the 
new medium is different’”) (emphasis added). In the scholarly literature, 
see, e.g., Ysolde Gendreau, A Technologically Neutral Solution for the 
Internet: Is it Wishful Thinking, in SCIENCE, TRUTH AND JUSTICE 198, 199 
(Joost Blom & Hélène Dumont eds., 2001) (noting, in the copyright 
context, that “[i]t has become commonplace to say that any change in a 
copyright legislation that would be required in order to come to terms with 
the Internet should be drafted in a technologically neutral manner”) 
(emphasis added). 
24. The vagueness principle also appears at times as demanding that 
law be expressed but in terms of the functions or effects of technological 
artefacts. Bert Jaap-Koops, for instance, speaks somewhat loosely at times 
of functions and effects, at others only of effects (“[T]he purpose of a 
regulation must be to regulate functions and effects, not means”. Koops, 
supra note 22, at ... . “From the perspective of the goal of regulation, the 
statement stresses that, in principle, the effects of ICT should be regulated, 
but not technology itself”. Koops, supra note 22, at ...). However, we do 
better in understanding that, due to its time-binding properties, to its 
orientation towards the future, law typically reflects, in its utterances, the 
functions of technological artefacts, not yet the effects of these. When law 
comes into being such effects do not yet exist. Technological artefacts, in 
this sense, are a virtualization of functions. See, e.g., Pierre Lévy, supra 
note 21, at 94 (“Where do tools come from? Initially, we identify some 
physical or mental function of a living being (striking, trapping, walking, 
flying, calculating). We then detach these functions from a specified 
assemblage of flesh, bones, and neurons. In doing so we also separate 
them from internal and subjective experience. The abstract function is 
materialized in a new form, which differs from the animal’s customary 
gesture”) (emphasis added). Regulating effects is thus in part redundant 
and in part impossible an enterprise. To the extent that effects are a linear 
actualization of functions, effects will be reached by the utterances of law 
as functions unfold into them. Seeking to regulate the not yet actual adds 
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values of higher nature) – for all other reasons are excluded 
by the vagueness principle. The ideal of treating alike 
technological artefacts with like functions may seem rather 
intuitive – and is at times called the “principle of functional 
equivalence”. It points to the very likeable proposition that no 
action should be taken by the state for arbitrary or capricious 
reasons. Hence, if more than one technological artefact 
performs the same tasks, why should the law discriminate 
amongst these? 
 There are two answers for the functional equivalence 
argument. The first is irresistibly contemptuous: in so evolved, 
so complex a moment of societal life that we boldly proclaim 
as a new enlightenment, the information age, amongst other 
similar self-congratulatory sobriquets, why would we need a 
new principle to convey a general idea of reasonableness that 
should by now be the ultimate tautology of any minimally 
established legal system – a general idea that every legal 
action must be action for a reason? Second, the notion that we 
may need to express the contours of reasonableness with 
regard to technology faces the challenge that functional 
equivalence may not be the proper way of doing so, for the 
simple reason that technological artefacts matter for reasons 
much more diverse than their functions. Technological 
artefacts are multidimensional – they are enacted in different 
topologies
25 
and may be approached from different directions, 
in each of which the law may need to focus on properties 
extending much beyond their functions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nothing to this extent. And then there is the authorial, the innovative, 
surprising, the unexpected, that portion of effects that we would have 
failed spectacularly in failing to predict. These are the unintended 
consequences of the unfolding of functions of technological artefacts – 
that which was not originally written, would never have been and cannot 
thus be part of the law. 
25. See John Law, Objects and Spaces, 19:5-6 THEORY, CULTURE & 
SOCIETY 91, 102 (2002) (arguing that “objects are topologically multiple, 
existing as intersections or interferences between different spaces 
including regions, networks, and fluids”). 
14   
 
 
 
 Think of computer programs, for instance. They may 
make computers work in certain ways – these, the functions 
that have been virtualized in them. But beyond their 
functional dimension, computer programs also have a 
semiological dimension – they have a language; they are 
written in ways which, depending on one’s degrees of 
technological savviness, may be thought of as having enough 
value as forms of literary expression as to be awarded 
protection under the rules of copyright. This double 
functional-semiological configuration was at the very root of 
the debates on how to protect computer programs when they 
were first unbundled from servers and desktops and started to 
experience a life of their own as central goods of the world we 
now live in. Copyright now recognizes the literary worth of 
computer programs and does so not because of their functions, 
whose protection is entirely foreign to copyright, but because 
of the different, creative ways in which computer programs 
may be written. 
 Besides their functions and their languages, computer 
programs may also differ in their architecture and in their 
forms of development. They may have an open architecture – 
where their structure and the wording of their code are open to 
society at large – or a closed one. They may be developed in a 
hierarchical, top-down, cathedral-like fashion or they may be 
developed in a decentralized, bottom-up, bazaar-like 
fashion.
26
 Far from being irrelevant for law, politics and 
society in general, architecture and forms of development of 
computer programs matter profoundly. I have argued 
elsewhere
27
 that for governments, for instance, only the 
adoption of programs that are open to public scrutiny and 
participation is compatible with the democratic principle. As 
                                                                                       
26. See ERIC RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS 
ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (2nd 
ed. 2001). 
27 . Marcelo Thompson, The Democracy of FLOSS: Software 
Procurement Under the Democratic Principle, 5:1-2 UNIVERSITY OF 
OTTAWA LAW & TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 79. 
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computer programs determine how important public functions 
are carried out and also structure the relations of power 
between governments and private companies, including 
foreign monopolies, it is of paramount importance that 
governments may be able to know what the code of their 
computers say – and that civil society organizations may act 
as custodians of this key dimension of freedom of information 
principles, except where national security imperatives demand 
otherwise. 
 That is to say, law here may need to regulate, enjoin 
governments to embrace certain types of technological 
artefacts for reasons other than their functions. The same 
happens, for instance, with regard to the ongoing process of 
transformation of the architecture of both the personal 
computer and the Internet. In a work of profound relevance,
28
 
Jonathan Zittrain has noted how computers and the Internet 
are moving towards a model of increasing control and 
restriction, which is very different from the model under 
which they were originally conceived. 
 The original PC and the original Internet were, in 
Zittrain’s view, characterized by an “overall capacity to 
produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and 
uncoordinated audiences”.29 The conditio sine qua non of a 
PC operating system was that of permitting consumers to run 
third-party code. Similarly, the original architecture of the 
Internet was such that computing processes would take place 
at the endpoints – the desktop PCs – while the core of the 
Internet would be one of extreme simplicity, enabling 
information to flow end-to-end. The original design of both 
the operating systems of PCs and the Internet in its core layers 
would make them accessible, uncomplicated, flexible, and, 
because of that, leveraging technological artefacts.
30  
This 
model, according to Zittrain, is now changing – and the ways 
                                                                                       
28. Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974. 
29. Id. at 1980. 
30. Id. at 1982-1996. 
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in which it is, I would add, have less to do with the functions 
of the Internet and the PCs than they have to do with the 
architecture of the world-scale computational grid in which 
the Internet and the PC are intertwined. 
 On the one hand, things which used to be done at the 
PC are now being done somewhere else on the Internet, and 
this will increasingly happen as the capacity of broadband 
networks unfolds. “The Internet is the computer” – the 
modish expression says, reflecting the fact that an increasing 
number of processes are getting concentrated under a handful 
of gatekeepers operating invisibly in the digital cloud.31 On 
the other hand, people are more and more adopting devices 
which, though in theory being able to perform as wide a range 
of functions as desktop computers do, are locked down, 
closed in ways that make a wide range of processes that could 
otherwise be performed in them contingent upon authorization 
– for instance, there are much more stringent requirements for 
software to be able to run on tablet devices such as the iPad 
and video game consoles such as the Xbox than there would 
originally be for the same processes to happen on desktop PCs. 
Those devices are much more constrained – tethered – and 
thus less generative than the original PC was designed to be. 
 When one puts all these fragments together, the picture 
that emerges is that of an increasingly closed, concentrated, 
gatekeeped Internet. Activities need permission for being 
performed and every process that leads to their performance is 
now more secret, less transparent and thus of much narrower 
possibilities of mastery and innovation by society at large. If 
law is to address these problems it will need to choose 
between different possible technological models – and do so 
by regulating technological artefacts themselves through 
properties other than their functions. 
 The vagueness principle, however, restrains such 
choices by directing the law to focus only on the functions of 
                                                                                       
31. Zittrain speaks of a “generative grid of Internet and PCs”. Id. at 
1979 (emphasis added). 
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technological artefacts
32
 – or on whatever other incomplete 
dimension an even more abstruse enunciation of technological 
neutrality would command. How internally incoherent doing 
so is should already be clear enough by now. What we do 
need to clarify before taking our analysis further in the next 
section is the nature of those restraints. It may seem that their 
pertaining to technological matters obliges us to address their 
eventual problems anew, on sheer technological grounds, as if 
there were no long-standing questions of political philosophy 
into which they fit. There have been so far no attempts to 
reconcile technological neutrality with its possible political 
orientations. True, there have been some not very persuasive 
attempts to approach it with law and economics lenses.
33
 
These, however, are just unsuspected manifestations of the 
same disenchanted, politically sceptic mood on which 
technological neutrality feeds – and which we are going to 
discuss below. 
 The new form of restraint that technological neutrality 
reflects is then just partially new, for, as noted in the 
introduction, it is also a restatement of much older forms of 
political scepticism. While the vagueness principle excludes 
reasons of a technological sort – those that do not relate to the 
functions of technological artefacts – it also does so with 
reasons of political nature. It would be indeed a mistake to 
assume that technological artefacts, though bestrewn with 
technological reasons, do not also assume a more or less 
                                                                                       
32. As noted before, the vagueness principle also, or perhaps mainly 
commands the law to focus only on the values it seeks to uphold. This, 
however, takes the principle to such an extreme proportion as to transform 
the law in a statement of values. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring 
Dilemmas: Law's Race to Keep Up with Technological Change, 2 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 273 (2007) (“The only way to guarantee 
technology neutrality into the future so that new technologies will be 
treated fairly is to enact a law whose level of generality corresponds with 
the highest level goal that the lawmakers wish to achieve.  However, a rule 
such as: All must act so as to preserve human life is ridiculous for other 
reasons”). 
33. See, e.g., Kamecke & Korber, supra note 23. 
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intense political form. Reasons of both technological and, 
wittingly or not, political nature are intertwined in the design 
of technological artefacts. And both are excluded from the 
realm of state action by technological neutrality, which, with 
regard to the political, reflects thus the same scope and the 
same disenchanting effects that traditional doctrines of 
political neutrality do. 
 To explain that the technological and the political are 
intertwined in technological artefacts moves us beyond age-
old debates between the autonomy (or substantive)
34
 and the 
social construction (or instrumental) views of technology.
35
 
On the one hand, one does not need to deny that technology, 
as reflected in its own, technological reasons may indeed be 
self-created, operatively closed and functionally differentiated 
from social processes in general – that is, one does not need to 
deny the autonomy of technological reasons. In this sense, the 
reasons of technology are indeed different from the reasons of 
politics. Here one may agree with Carl Schmitt, when he says 
that “no conclusions which usually can be drawn from the 
central domains of spiritual life can be derived from pure 
                                                                                       
34. Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul are the foremost exponents of 
the autonomy view which, in Andrew Feenberg’s words, “attributes an 
autonomous cultural force to technology that overrides all traditional or 
competing values”. ANDREW FEENBERG, CRITICAL THEORY OF 
TECHNOLOGY 5 (1991). For Heidegger’s view, see Martin Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology, in HEIDEGGER’S THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (William Lovitt trans., 
1977). For Ellul’s, see JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
(John Wilkinson trans., 1967). 
35. For an accessible overview of both theories, see James Garvey, The 
Moral Use of Technology, 61 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY 
SUPPLEMENT 241 (2007) (UK) (inter alia agreeing with Andrew Feenberg 
on the social prevalence of the instrumental view and attributing it most 
prominently to Francis Bacon: “Bacon shows us that if our eyes fall 
comprehensively on the ends we hope to achieve, our default conception 
of technology is merely a means for getting something else”). For a more 
comprehensive survey from a legal perspective, see Arthur Cockfield, 
Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL 383 
(2004) (Can.). 
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technology as nothing but technology – neither a concept of 
cultural progress, nor a type of clerc or spiritual leader, nor a 
specific political system”.36 Technology in this sense can be 
understood according to Ralph Schroeder's definition, in 
which he draws on Ian Hacking,
37
 as the “adventure of the 
inter-locking of refining and manipulating” technological 
artefacts – and thus as a process distinguished from these.38 
 On the other hand, when our focus moves from 
technological reasons towards technological artefacts, any 
illusion of autonomy disappears. This is so as, when reflected 
in the architecture of technological artefacts, technological 
reasons are modified by political ones. That is to say, law and 
politics provide reasons that impinge upon whatever 
otherwise purely technological reasons the designers of 
technological artefacts may hold. When technological 
artefacts are enacted, it is on the balance of reasons of 
different natures, including political reasons, that their 
configuration will ultimately hinge. Artefacts thus, as 
Langdon Winner notes, have politics.
39
 In some cases, they 
settle particular states of affair;
40
 in others, they carry 
properties which are only compatible with certain political 
                                                                                       
36. Schmitt, supra note 5, at 92. 
37. IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING (1983). 
38 . RALPH SCHROEDER, RETHINKING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 8-9 (2007) (“[M]odern technology has been the 
adventure of the interlocking of refining and manipulating since 
technological advance consists of the process whereby artifacts are 
continually being modified in order to enhance or extend our mastery of 
the world”). 
39. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH 
FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 19-39 (1986) 
40. A famous example discussed by Winner is that of the overpasses of 
Long Island, controversially projected by Robert Moses, New York's 
architectural mastermind, to stand at very low height so as to prevent low 
income people, who would normally travel by bus, from accessing the 
island. Id. at 22-23. More related to our points in this paper, we may think 
of the closed v. open source software example discussed earlier in this 
section. 
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configurations.
41
 In all such cases the design of technological 
artefacts, in the different dimensions of these, is constrained 
by reasons of political nature that we can say are ultimately 
embedded in technological artefacts. 
 It follows that to command law not to describe the 
properties of technological artefacts implies deference to 
whatever techno-political configuration these may assume.
42
 
Doctrines that command the exclusion of reasons of 
technological nature from law and politics prevent these from 
interweaving in their fabric any idealized image to be pursued 
by the designers of technological artefacts – any image that 
depicts an integral and reflective equilibrium
43
 between 
                                                                                       
41 . For instance, Winner mentions the inherently authoritarian 
properties reflected in the functionalities of the atomic bomb. Id. at 34. 
42 . It could not actually be otherwise, due to the inherent political 
properties of law itself. When law incorporates technological reasons it 
also necessarily reflects the political repercussions of these. When law 
excludes any set of political considerations other political considerations 
take the place of these. 
43. I use the expression in the Dworkinian sense, not the Rawlsian one. 
While John Rawls restricts his method of reflective equilibrium to the 
limited range of goods that he admits of as part of the political constitution, 
Ronald Dworkin is ready to take up the enterprise in its full breadth. In 
what relates to our argument, there is indeed no reason to rule out any 
individual or collective, political or otherwise cultural dimension of 
technological artefacts from the realm of political concern. We enlarge on 
this point in the upcoming sections. On the difference between his 
approach and Rawls’s, see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 
263-264 (2011) (“Our challenge is in some ways like that posed by John 
Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium, but it is more ambitious and 
more hazardous. Rawls aimed at a kind of integrity among abstract and 
concrete convictions about justice, but one that allowed subordination, 
compromise, and balancing among different values. He insisted on a 
"lexical priority" of liberty to equality, for example. He did not aim to 
interpret each value in the light of others so that each supported rather than 
challenged the others. That difference reflects a deeper one. Our strategy is 
driven by a theory of moral and interpretive truth [...]”). See also Ronald 
Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 
24:1 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 18 (2004) (UK) ("My 
recommendation is similar to Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium, 
which aims to bring our intuitions and theories about justice into line with 
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technological reasons and other, political ones. In doing so, 
technological neutrality threatens to exclude the reasons 
ensuing from such a balance from the design of technological 
artefacts – if only because it reduces the likelihood that the 
designers of technological artefacts will embrace those 
reasons as theirs in cases of evaluative shortcoming. The 
outcome is one in which values and conceptions of the good 
relative to the technological will be reflected neither in the 
normative structure nor in the factual infrastructure of an 
increasingly dehumanized technological society.
44
 
 This brings us to two important points. The first is that, 
by excluding state action based on conceptions of the good – 
here those that are reflected in technological artefacts –, 
technological neutrality is tantamount to political neutrality. 
Doctrines of political neutrality indeed enjoin governments 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
one another. The difference with Rawls' methodology is more striking than 
the similarities, however, because the equilibrium I believe philosophy 
must seek is not limited, as his is, to the constitutional essentials of politics, 
but embraces what he calls a 'comprehensive' theory that includes personal 
morality and ethics as well”).  
44. Such a world of surrender of the political to the technological, a 
world in which law, by not describing the technological, fully defers to it, 
is the ultimate realization of Justice Holmes's prophecy: “[T]he man of the 
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics”. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10:8 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). For an even more troubling account than that of the bad-man style 
prophecies of Holmes and legal realism, see Lee Loevinger's proposition 
of a science of jurimetrics, e.g. in Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward 
(1949) 33:5 MINN. L. REV. 455 and Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The 
Methodology of Legal Inquiry, 28:1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 5 (1963). 
Jurimetrics, as Loevinger explains, is not concerned with the “meaningless 
questions” of jurisprudence (1949, at 455), “with a debate as to whether 
the metaphorical life of the law has been logic or experience” (1963, at 35). 
Rather, jurimetrics “is concerned only with investigating the structure and 
dimensions of all experience that is relevant to the law" (id.) "It is (...) the 
doctrine that the methods of scientific inquiry should be extended to every 
phase of human activity which is of concern to society" (1949, at 472). 
Technological neutrality’s political deference to technology is thus old 
wine in new bottles. The problem, however, is that now we have been 
drinking of it. 
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not to make choices between different conceptions of the 
good life. They exclude these from the realm of state action 
altogether, even where value lies in pursuing them.
45
 
Technological neutrality does precisely the same, but it also 
does more. This is our second point. The widespread adoption 
of a principle of technological neutrality raises the doctrine of 
neutrality to a position of prominence in the realms of law and 
politics that this had never had before. 
 As I had noted above, technological artefacts carry 
embedded in them a balance of the different reasons that their 
developers hold. Beyond (autonomous or not) typically 
technological reasons, technological designers may embed in 
technological artefacts their personal conceptions of values 
such as friendship, religion
46
 and, overall, culture. These are 
values that political neutrality has traditionally excluded from 
the realm of state action and, in this sense, technological 
neutrality adds nothing new in closing the eyes of politics to 
these dimensions of technological artefacts. But technological 
neutrality also excludes reasons that are of central importance 
to the political theories of many philosophers who otherwise 
subscribe to political neutrality. To the extent that 
technological artefacts reflect their designers’ understandings 
                                                                                       
45. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 110-111 (1986) 
(“The doctrine of neutrality is a doctrine of restraint for it advocates 
neutrality between valid and invalid ideals of the good. It does not demand 
that the government shall avoid promoting unacceptable ideals. Rather, it 
commands the government to make sure that its actions do not help 
acceptable ideals more than unacceptable ones, to see to it that its actions 
will not hinder the cause of false ideals more than they do that of true 
ones"). 
46. One needs not subscribe to any particular theological creed to see 
the Ghost in the machine. One just needs to recognize the religious 
foundations of much in the moral reasons embedded in our arguably 
disenchanted discourses.. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT 
OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010). See also PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: 
ADAM, EVE, AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (2006). See also NUMA DENIS 
FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY: A STUDY OF THE RELIGIONS, 
LAWS, AND INSTITUTIONS OF GREECE AND ROME (William Small trans., 
The Johns Hopkins University Press 1980) (1864). 
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about concepts such as human personhood, personal identity, 
freedom, privacy and these are excluded from politics by the 
idea of technological neutrality, doctrines of political 
neutrality reach entirely unprecedented dimensions with 
regard to their scope. 
 But it is not merely the scope of political neutrality 
that has been formidably extended in the 21
st
 century – its 
reach also has. Up to the past century, the doctrine of 
neutrality had indeed found limited concrete expression in the 
fundamental political decisions of countries around the world. 
It lived but in the political mood and sceptical attitude of 
some champions of absolute or quasi-absolute freedom – a 
never fully realized product of intellectual export. It barked 
punctiliously, but did not bite. Beyond topical spellings in 
issues such as the non-establishment of religion by the state, 
there had been no successful attempts to embed an 
overarching principle of neutrality in the constitutional 
foundations of liberal societies. In international human rights 
law, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights
47
 would naturally deflect its signatories from 
the exclusion of pursuits that neutrality could have otherwise 
excluded from the scope of state action. There is no deny that, 
theoretically, some of the most prominent liberal doctrines of 
the past century did rely, to a huge extent, on the supposed 
soundness of a principled pursuit of political neutrality. But 
such a theoretical conviction, has now, with new cloak, been 
brought to the realm of praxis in monumental terms. 
 What is most surprising, however, is that technological 
neutrality has come to revive political neutrality with such an 
intensity at a time in which the theoretical foundations of the 
latter seemed to have already called it a day, when old 
conceptions of liberal neutrality seemed to have given place to 
new orientations in liberal theory and practice that are more 
                                                                                       
47. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
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genuinely faithful to value pluralism and reconcilable with the 
philosophical traditions of Eastern societies. Such a strange 
revival cannot thus be explained but by the vapidity of the 
new neutrality, by its lack of pursued connections with any 
theoretical universes – for its scepticism despises these 
universes altogether. One cannot justify the adoption of 
technological neutrality, however, if not by assessing it 
against the backdrop of the more established debates in which, 
wittingly or not, technological neutrality is rooted – those of 
political neutrality. 
 Having hinted in the lines above at the connections 
between technological neutrality and political neutrality, in 
the next section we turn to our mission described at the outset 
of this paper – to question the prospects of political neutrality 
itself in the 21
st
 century as well as of the flavours of liberalism 
based on it. There are lessons to be learned here that concern 
the very foundations of doctrines of neutral political concern 
and of liberalism itself in the information age. They reflect the 
paradigmatic change that technologies have brought to 
contemporary societies and, related to these, the overarching 
trend of convergence between the political orientations of East 
and West in at least one respect: the development of a 
common conception of the human person that is typical of the 
times we live in – a conception based on an explicitly 
articulated normative reality of connectedness. 
 In the big pictures of political theory and praxis this 
more expansive conception of the person seems to have been 
in effect factored in. But in those undeservingly trite matters 
of everyday policy the new neutrality trifles with any more 
reflective notion of the self. Symptomatically, as two authors 
note as a reason for commending it: “technological neutrality 
is a quite particular anti-discriminatory rule as it protects 
technologies and thus property rights instead of legal 
subjects”.48 However, as our venture in this work concerns the 
                                                                                       
48. Kamecke & Korber, supra note 23, at 331. 
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latter, we must pursue the integrity of the large view deep in 
which they are – we are – embedded. 
III. A MORE PERFECT UNION – OR THE VALUE OF SHÙ 
 
In November 4, 2008, the president of a distinctively liberal 
bastion was elected with the promise of bringing people 
together on the path to a more perfect union. “[I]n the end, 
then, what is called for is nothing more, and nothing less, than 
what all the world’s great religions demand – that we do unto 
others as we would have them do unto us. (...) Let us find that 
common stake we all have in one another, and let our politics 
reflect that spirit as well”49 – said then the ruler-to-be.50 In 
China, this has been framed in similar terms since at least the 
Spring and Autumn Period. It is called shù (恕),51 the method 
of rén (仁 ).52  And the collective spirit which one expects 
                                                                                       
49. Barack Obama, President, U.S., A More Perfect Union, Speech 
Before the National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Mar. 
18, 2008), WASHINGTON WIRE: POLITICAL INSIGHT AND ANALYSIS FROM 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL'S CAPITAL BUREAU, Mar. 18, 2008, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/03/18/text-of-obamas-speech-a-more-
perfect-union 
50. With that speech, the then candidate Barak Obama redefined the 
directions of the US presidential elections, capturing and yet challenging 
the collective mindset after eight years of liberal policies of a very 
different nature. 
51. “Tzu-kun asked, ‘Is there a single word which can be a guide to 
conduct throughout one’s life?’ The Master said, ‘It is perhaps the word 
“shu”. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire’”. 
CONFUCIUS, ANALECTS, 15.24 (Dim Cheuk Lau trans., Penguin Books 
1979) [hereinafter Analects # (D.C. Lau Translation)]. 
52 . “Authoritative persons establish others in seeking to establish 
themselves and promote others in seeking to get there themselves. 
Correlating one's conduct with those near at hand can be said to be the 
method of becoming an authoritative person”. Confucius, Analects, 6.30 
(Roger T. Ames & Henry Rosemont Jr. Trans), in Roger T. Ames & Henry 
Rosemont Jr., THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
TRANSLATION 110 (1998) [hereinafter Analects # (Ames and Rosemont 
Translation)]. What Ames and Rosemont translate by “authoritative 
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politics to reflect may be no other but that in whose 
knowledge exemplary persons become sages – and which, 
even before Confucian times, here has been known as 
tianming (天命), or Heaven’s Mandate.53 
 Such an attractive – and hopefully not too spurious – 
similarity between important elements of the Confucian 
philosophical project and more collective-oriented turns in 
contemporary liberal politics may reflect a broader perception 
of the self in contemporary knowledge-based societies. One 
can now say that the political structures of contemporary 
liberal societies reflect the irresistible importance of collective 
values, of which knowledge is the paramount,
54
 for the pursuit 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
personhood” is a specific form of the word rén (here represented by 
Confucius as 仁). In D.C. Lau’s translation it appears as “benevolence”. 
See supra note 51, at 85. The Ames and Rosemont translation, however, 
highlights both the notes of self-cultivation and connectedness that the 
idea of personhood assumes in the Confucian project. See, for instance, 
Roger T Ames, Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism: A Dialogue, 
30:3&4 JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 403, 412 (2003) 
(“‘Authoritative’ entails the ‘authority’ that a person comes to represent in 
community by becoming ren, embodying in oneself the values and 
customs of one’s tradition through the performance of ritual propriety (li)”. 
The èr (二) element of rén , which in English translates as two, would 
underscore “the Confucian assumption that one cannot become a person 
by oneself—we are, from our inchoate beginnings, irreducibly social”. Id. 
at 411. 
53. “Knowing tianming, exemplary persons hold it in awe, because its 
realization is of great import – it is the realization of authoritativeness, of 
ethico-political order, of sagehood (Analects 16.8)”. SOR-HOON TAN, 
CONFUCIAN DEMOCRACY: A DEWEYAN RECONSTRUCTION 144 (2004). 
54. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2nd ed., 
2011) (1980), assigning central importance to knowledge as a basic, self-
evident form of good. Though Finnis, on the one hand, denies the idea that 
knowledge amounts to a supreme form of good (at 62), on the other hand 
the importance of knowledge for practical reasonableness is evident. And 
while practical reasonableness structures our pursuit of all other goods (id. 
at 100), knowledge “makes intelligible [...] any particular instance of the 
human activity and commitment involved in such pursuit” (id. at 62). For 
Finnis, the orientation towards the common good is a requirement of prac-
tical reasonableness itself, and thus does not seem to be a distinctive trait 
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of freedom and the construction of the self. The self of the 
most persuasive versions of contemporary liberalism is indeed 
one that does not exist but in the pursuit of an integral 
perception of the world around it.
55
 As noted by an important 
contemporary liberal, “individuals inevitably derive their 
goals by which they constitute their lives from the stock of 
social forms available to them, and the feasible variations of it. 
(...) By being teachers, production workers, drivers, public 
servants, loyal friends and family people, loyal to their 
communities, nature loving, and so on, they will be pursuing 
their own goals, enhancing their own well-being, and also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the good of knowledge. Yet, this should not prevent us from recogniz-
ing that knowledge is the collective good par excellence, for its pursuit 
requires the concurrence of many minds at different times and with differ-
ent dispositions. The writing of the annals of truth – including truth about 
the self – is, in effect, a process of collective authorship. Not too distant 
from this collective perspective, we can think of the Platonic idea of “true 
wisdom as the highest form of love” – and, indeed, of the the philosopher 
as a lover of wisdom (Christopher Gill, Introduction to PLATO, THE SYM-
POSIUM (Christopher Gill ed., trans., Penguin Press, 1999), at xxix (c. 384-
379 B.C.E.)).
 
55. Like the Hegelian self, the self of contemporary liberalism is one 
whose consciousness “can only be attained when men come to see 
themselves as emanation of universal Geist. For it is only then that they 
will not see the surrounding universe as limit”. CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 
148 (1975). It is not thus in any sense strange, for instance, to pursue 
justifications for Human Rights discourse in Hegelian ideas of recognition, 
as Costas Douzinas did in his Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can 
Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights, 29:3 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 
379 (2002). In line with our ideas above, Douzinas notes, drawing on 
Charles Taylor, that “[h]uman history moves towards a ‘total integrity’, in 
which the opposition between self and other will have been overcome and 
the external reality which determines us contains nothing alien or hostile. 
Integrity will be achieved only when our dependence on the external world 
is dialectically negated, in other words, when humanity is at home in its 
environment” (at 384). Interestingly, this project of integrity is not 
divorced from Confucian ideas of harmony, and one can also purse 
justifications for Human Rights discourse within Confucian philosophy, as 
Stephen Angle has recently done (see Angle, infra note 99 and 
accompanying text). 
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serving their communities, and generally living in a morally 
worthy way”.56 
 The liberal project of the 21st century is thus one in 
which the Rawlsian, veiled, anti-social conception of the self 
has been largely superseded. In today’s knowledge-based 
societies, theories grounded on artifices that prevent the self 
from knowing or acting upon what’s known are a 
paradigmatic contradiction. The Rawlsian framework 
excludes knowledge in a twofold way. On the one hand, it 
does so procedurally, by positioning the self in an original 
position that lies behind a veil of ignorance
57
 – and in which 
the self is not aware of its social location, natural endowments 
and conceptions of the good. On the other hand, it excludes 
knowledge substantively. That is so as the antecedently 
individuated selves
58
 of the original position, by being 
deprived of their full belongingness to the collective, moral 
space of questions,
59
 can only reach principles of justice 
compatible with their asocial individualism. Conceptions of 
the good of more communal nature are thus filtered by the 
veil ignorance. The political structure one arrives at assigns 
priority to conceptions of the good of an individualist 
character, which are the only thought to deserve the sobriquet 
of rights. Knowledge-related, public goods are just not here.
60
 
 The political structures of old-fashioned forms of 
liberalism thus are – or rather claim to be – neutral between 
ideals and conceptions of the good (i.e. between value 
categories of arguably lesser priority than rights). In this sense, 
                                                                                       
56. Raz, supra note 45, at 319. 
57. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (2nd 1999) (1971). 
58. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 62 
(2nd ed 1998) (1995). 
59 . CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF 
MODERN IDENTITY 29 (1991). 
60. See Rawls, supra note 58, at 291 (“[T]he principles of justice do 
not permit subsidizing universities and institutes, or opera and the theatre, 
on the grounds that these institutions are intrinsically valuable, and that 
those who engage in them are to be supported even at some significant 
expense to others who do not receive compensating benefits”). 
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they are based on anti-perfectionist doctrines, which exclude 
the implementation even of worthy ideals of the good life.
61
 
They command governmental restraint, restricting the pursuit 
of valuable goals and precluding the possibility of 
governmental action even where there would be sound 
reasons for action.
62
 But why? One of the most significant 
explanations, already hinted at above a number of times, is 
that doctrines of neutrality are founded in a widespread, if 
self-defeating scepticism about the abilities of the political 
structures of society to grasp and pursue conceptions of the 
good life. They were the cornerstone of some of the most 
prominent liberal political theories of the second half of the 
last century – both of egalitarian and libertarian persuasions. 
So strongly their sceptical roots have marked twentieth 
century liberal theory that William Galston, writing at that 
time, noted: “[c]ontemporary liberal theory consists of the 
attempt to combine this s[k]epticism about theories of the 
good life with the belief in philosophically defensible 
principles that regulate relations among individuals”. 63 
 Galston also explains why such an attempt failed – in 
short, those liberal theories of the past century would 
themselves “covertly employ theories of the good”.64 In effect, 
they mistakenly assumed that liberal freedoms of an 
individualistic nature (rights) are more objectively definable 
than more collective-oriented ones (which would come under 
the category of goods). As Claudio Michelon notes in his 
excellent “Being Apart from Reasons”, liberals of which 
Thomas Nagel is the best example, assumed rights to be based 
                                                                                       
61. See supra note 46. 
62. Id. at 110 (“Principles of restraint restrict the pursuit of good or 
valuable goals, they exclude action for valid, sound reasons for action, or 
they enjoin government to preserve a state of affairs which there are good 
reasons to change").  
63. WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 79 (1991). 
64.  Id. 
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on “common grounds of justification”65 while reserving the 
lesser category of “personal beliefs” to goods in general.66 
This, if it was the case, could even explain why rights could 
have priority over the good. However, as Michelon submits, 
common grounds of justification are “as likely to ground 
massacres as personal moral beliefs”.67 Liberals would have 
to provide more satisfactory justifications for their absolute 
priority of the right over the good if such a systematic priority 
were not to exist as a moral argument in itself. As those 
justifications do not exist, liberals’ claims to objectivity fail. 
Their “insulation between reasons for the right and reasons for 
the good”68 cannot be sustained. Neither can the agenda for 
asocial individualism on which their perception of the priority 
of rights is based. 
 Neutrality claims of industrial age’s liberal theory 
could not resist either the communitarian challenge or the 
challenge of contemporary liberals who understand that the 
                                                                                       
65. CLAUDIO MICHELON, BEING APART FROM REASONS: THE ROLE OF 
REASONS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORAL DECISION-MAKING 97 (2010). A 
note is due here to explain that the idea of “common grounds of 
justification” does not relate to any communal nature of liberal goods – or, 
for liberals, rights. Rather, it refers to the assumption that the only goods 
people would acquiesce to seeing reflected by the political order would be 
those with a higher degree of objectivity; those which can ground a shared 
belief on their validity. For last century liberals, however, such goods are 
limited to those individualistic ones available to the disembedded person 
of the Rawlsian original position. As Mulhall and Swift note, the 
communitarian objection in this regard is that “the liberal sees society as 
nothing more than a cooperative venture for the pursuit of individual 
advantage, as an essentially private association formed by individuals 
whose essential interests are defined independently of, and in a sense prior 
to, the community of which they are members. Conceptions of the good 
that are more strongly communal in content, that have as part of their very 
nature an insistence that social bonds are valuable in themselves, over and 
above their value as means to the attainment of other, merely individual, 
goods, are thereby downgraded”. STEPHAN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, 
LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS (2nd ed. 1996). 
66. Michelon, id. at 97-98. 
67. Id. at 99. 
68. Id. 
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very value of personal autonomy is socially embedded. As we 
move further into the information age, the challenges to 
neutrality claims are magnified as the facts are thrown in the 
face of liberal theories of the past. First, the locus of power is 
shifting, to a great extent, from the state to non-state actors. 
Multinational corporations, we know well, now challenge 
even the most powerful states and try to sow dissent amongst 
brothers as the seasons of their convenience shift.
69
 The 
sources thesis in analytical jurisprudence needs to face the 
challenge of legal pluralism, which is typical of a time of 
what Julia Black calls decentred regulation
70
 or, as Neil 
McCormick would wish it, post-positivism.
71
 Similarly, 
political theory needs to deal with the exercise of power by 
actors that try to control the most important, if alternative 
sources of normativity of our time. Processes of 
standardization of technologies such as the Internet have a 
pervasive impact on our lives and attempts by non-state actors 
to capture the unfolding of such processes are much more 
serious than many such carried out in the houses of 
parliament.
72
 What is the role of Nation-States that intend to 
preserve their relevance in light of all that? 
 This is linked to a second, and most important, 
challenge to liberal neutrality, which is that the nature of the 
power exerted by non-state actors is shifting as well. Non-
state actors of the 21st century are not simply providers of 
Coca Cola, largely invariable telecommunications services or 
                                                                                       
69. See infra p. ..., for a discussion of Google’s move of its search 
engine from Mainland China to Hong Kong after years cooperating with 
the PRC Government. 
70. See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of 
Regulation and Self Regulation in a "Post-Regulatory" World, 54 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 103 (2002) (UK). 
71 . See NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN 
LEGAL THEORY 278-279 (2009). 
72. See LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2009), for a comprehensive discussion of the 
political processes surrounding the protocols upon which the Internet 
functions. 
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even of massive electricity grids. They are the typical, 
fundamental stakeholders of a society that has experienced a 
paradigmatic shift, towards what Manuel Castells has termed 
“informationalism”. 73  They provide us with informational 
goods that are deeply intertwined with zones of societal 
happening that, in the past, would cause furore if a state ever 
attempted to regulate. Think of Facebook, for instance – or, in 
China, think of RénRén.com or KāixīnWǎng. These sites 
provide us with ways of expressing and visualizing our 
friendships and otherwise affective relationships. Friendship, 
a fundamental private-yet-public form of good in both the 
communitarian and the Confucian traditions, is here expressed 
according to the technological artefacts provided by certain 
corporations. And so are the spaces between what is public 
and what is private in these relationships. 
 Social networking sites reflect, explicitly articulated or 
embedded in their technological infrastructure, powerful 
norms based on which people not only express but also 
constitute or revise their personal relationships. Does it matter 
if heteronomy reigns over the construction of technologies 
that increasingly define how people's relationships are carried 
out? Should the public worry about how such technologies are 
designed – in their many visual, architectural, functional 
dimensions? 
 For liberalism of the industrial age the answer seems 
clear. Different forms of friendship reflect but conceptions of 
the good life that should not be mingled in the basic structure 
of society.
74
 Politics should be neutral, so to say, with regard 
to friendship.  
                                                                                       
73.  MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 13 (2nd 
ed. 2009) (1996). 
74. For Rawls, the basic structure of society encompasses “the way in 
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties 
and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation”. Rawls, 
supra note 58, at 6. The conditions under which this obtains are given by 
the principles of justice agreed upon in the original position. Given the 
very limitedly social nature of such principles, more comprehensive moral 
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 Contemporary political theory, however, cannot dare 
to ignore a reality which is so visibly articulated right before 
its eyes. Power is exercised over the ways our constitutive 
attachments are formed or revised within the boundaries given 
by technology; people do fine-tune the course of their 
behaviour, the thickness of their modes of common 
expression to account for how different technological 
configurations affect their possibilities of expanding their 
personalities in the information environment.
75
 Digital 
natives
76
 expose their merriness on social networking sites as 
a token for affection – and yet they hope for possibilities of 
doing so in a selective manner. They wish that the tools will 
not spoil their bonds and their lives – and where they cannot 
wish so they will live if not less rich, at least different social 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
doctrines within which the value of friendship could be subject to inquiry 
are ruled out of the basic structure. It is in this sense that friendship 
appears not as a foundation of the basic structure but as a consequence of 
our following the rules that ensue from it. Id. at 412 (“Thus if those 
engaged in a system of social cooperation regularly act with evident 
intention to uphold its just (or fair) rules, bonds of friendship and mutual 
trust tend to develop among them, thereby holding them ever mores 
securely to the scheme”). To a more limited expression, not encompassing 
the range of attachments one understands by friendship, Rawls discusses 
the value of fraternity as providing a justification for the difference 
principle (and thus for distribution). He remarks: “The ideal of fraternity is 
sometimes thought to involve ties of sentiment and feeling which it is 
unrealistic to expect between members of the wider society” (Id. at 90-91) 
(emphasis added). 
75. See Janis Goldie, Virtual Communities and the Social Dimension of 
Privacy, 3:1 UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA LAW & TECHNOLOGY JOURNAL 133, 
141-142, 164 (discussing how virtual community participants use 
technological possibilities offered by technology to “negotiate the 
boundary between public and private, and hence, the society and the self”. 
According to Goldie, “virtual communities offer participants more control 
over their expression and interaction than previously possible, participants 
are further able to work on the reflexive project of the self in new and 
important ways”). 
76. I borrow the expression from JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN 
DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 
(2008). 
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experiences from those they would have lived otherwise. As 
network effects obtain,
77
 digital natives depend on those tools 
to express themselves; as the architecture (not just the 
functions) of those tools prevents migration towards different 
platforms, digital natives are chained to whatever 
technological configuration is enabled in the universe 
inhabited by their friends. 
 The question, thus, rather than if power and friendship 
should be mingled in the basic structure of society, is one of 
who is going to exercise such power in  an unavoidably 
political information environment – and one of to which 
extent we should defer to non-state sources the power of 
channelling of our affective possibilities. 
 Now, it is easy to try to make a scapegoat here of a 
more established liberal value – privacy and say that if 
regulation ever ensues in this area, if we are to define how the 
technological infrastructure should be designed, it would be 
exclusively because of the dangers of harm to the individual 
person with regard to her informational privacy. Traditionally, 
this has been in effect a matter to which the principle of 
technological neutrality is willing to make a concession. If 
one reads, for instance, the European Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications,
78 
one will see in its Article 14(1) 
the prescription that “no mandatory requirements for specific 
technical features are imposed on terminal or other electronic 
communication equipment which could impede the placing of 
equipment on the market”. Whatever that means (and we 
disputed in many ways the idea in Part II above), the 
exception is, in Article 14(3), that “measures may be adopted 
                                                                                       
77 . CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 45 (1999) (“[n]etwork 
effects arise when the value one user places on a good depends on how 
many other people are using it”). 
78. Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 on the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of 
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37. 
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to ensure that terminal equipment is constructed in a way that 
is compatible with the right of users to protect and control the 
use of their personal data” – though the Commission still 
needs to be informed of the adoption of such measures 
(Article 14(2)). In other words, technological neutrality here 
makes a concession for the protection of privacy and against 
harm. Nothing more liberal, perhaps. 
 The problems appear, however, when we extend such a 
sort of reasoning to the more relational realm of the 
information environment – and of social networking websites 
in particular. It has been increasingly recognized how 
inadequate the traditional contours of informational privacy 
have become to deal with the problem of privacy, or the 
expectation thereof, in public spaces – as many loci in the 
information environment happen to be.
79
 The scholarly 
literature has suggested new ideas such as contextual 
integrity
80
 and expressive privacy
81
 that reflect the need of 
providing people with a shelter that enables their 
communication processes to take place free from social 
overreaching in those spaces. This encompasses respect for 
the particular contexts of those processes, the avoidance of 
profiling and stigmatization and concerns much more 
relational ideas of identity and reputation than old conceptions 
of a right to be let alone. In other words, the protection that 
should ensue here considers an integral picture of the self that 
encompasses its constitutive attachments – its relations of 
affection and friendship. 
                                                                                       
79. See e.g. Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information 
Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17:5-6 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 559 
(1998) (Ger.). See also Anne Cheung, Rethinking Public Privacy in the 
Internet Age, 1:2 THE JOURNAL OF MEDIA LAW 191 (2009). 
80 . See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79:1 
WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004). See also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 
(2009). 
81. JUDITH DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE 
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 77 (1997). 
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 It is certainly not easy to grasp such a picture. This is 
actually the greatest challenge of our time. Many, most 
famously Isaiah Berlin, have derided the enterprise of 
embracing “positive liberty”82 – but what alternative is left for 
us before the change of paradigms in contemporary 
networked societies?
83
 Recently, the European Union Working 
Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to their 
Personal Data went to the trouble of trying to define the duties 
of users of social networking sites.
84
 It did so by relying on 
those users' relations of 'friendship' (the brackets were all 
around in the Opinion document) and understanding that users 
who have many acquaintances with whom they do not hold 
previous relations of friendship are data controllers and 
should be thus obliged to abide by data protection principles, 
whereas those users who have in their friends list mostly 
people with whom they do hold previous relations of 
friendship are covered by the exception for processing of 
personal data for purely personal or household purposes and 
                                                                                       
82 . Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, An Inaugural Lecture 
Delivered Before the University of Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958), reprinted in 
ISAIAH BERLIN & HENRY HARDY, LIBERTY - INCORPORATING 'FOUR 
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY' 166 (2002). 
83.  Joseph Raz, for instance, is ready to defend the idea of positive 
freedom as a synonym of what he prefers to call the capacity sense of 
autonomy. This involves “the possession of certain mental and physical 
abilities and the availability of an adequate range of options” as a 
requirement for one’s living a life which is “to a considerable extent his 
own creation”. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408 (1986). Raz 
believes all of us owe duties to each other with regard to autonomy that go 
beyond the traditional idea of the harm principle. Some of these duties, 
which are deeply related to our point in this chapter, concern the 
development of “cognitive capacities [required for the conduct of an 
autonomous life], such as the power to absorb, remember and use 
information, reasoning abilities, and the like”. Id. (emphasis added). 
Others relate to the availability of an adequate range of options. All are 
encompassed by Raz’s capacity sense of autonomy and the conception of 
the state that ensues from it. 
84. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on 
Online Social Networking, WP 163 01189/09/EN (Jun. 12, 2009). 
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are thus not data controllers within the context of the 
Directive on Personal Data Protection. It is clear from this that 
the Working Party found no alternative to regulate 'privacy' 
but to (loosely) interpret the idea of friendship – and consider 
its different degrees of thickness and obligations 
corresponding to these. Does this involve any judgement on 
conceptions of the good life? Of course it does. 
 All this is not to say that the notion of harm should no 
longer be a concern. “Freedom from psychological 
oppression”, a basic Rawlsian liberty required for what he 
calls “integrity of the person”,85 is certainly part of the reasons 
why it is important to care for how technological platforms 
are designed. What is not possible, though is to completely 
disentangle, as Rawls clearly does, “integrity of the person” 
from “the virtues of integrity”. 86  The latter, as Rawls sees 
them, are secondary in relation to his basic liberties and 
principles of justice. They encompass “truthfulness and 
sincerity, lucidity and commitment, or, as some say, 
authenticity”87 – and are not the state's business. But to which 
extent should one tolerate technological platforms that bring 
about exactly the opposite and think of authenticity (or 
authoritativeness?) as a matter completely foreign to the 
polis?
88
 
                                                                                       
85. Rawls, supra note 58, at 53. 
86.  Id. at 455. 
87. Id. 
88. John Finnis's critique in this regard to the Rawlsian view is very 
lucid: “For the sake of a ‘democratic’ impartiality between differing 
conceptions of human good, Rawls insists that, in selecting principles of 
justice, one must treat as primary goods only liberty, opportunity, wealth, 
and self-respect, and that one must not attribute intrinsic value to such 
basic forms of good as truth, or play, or art, or friendship”. JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 106 (1980). For Finnis, however, it 
is “unreasonable for anyone to deny that knowledge is (and is to be treated 
as) a form of excellence, and that error, illusion, muddle, superstition, and 
ignorance are evils that no one should wish for, or plan for, or encourage 
in himself or in others” (Id.). 
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 Friendship and knowledge are values that do and 
should come together in contemporary liberal politics – East 
and West. They are values towards which states cannot remain 
neutral. Sad as this may sound, the self that has never been 
befriended does not matter for contemporary politics – if it 
has ever mattered for politics at all. Rather, politics can only 
understand the self by drawing, to different degrees of depth, 
on the fabric of its constitutive attachments. Friendship is 
essential for self-knowledge – and it moves from the personal 
level, through to our notions of morality, civility and every 
conception of the good reflected in the political structure 
under which we choose to live. Without any inquiry about our 
constitutive attachments – and actually without having such 
constitutive attachments our moral and political choices 
become arbitrary. It is in this sense that Michael Sandel notes 
that “[f]riendship becomes a way of knowing as well as 
liking”.89 
 So is not different in the Confucian project, in which 
friendship and knowledge are so intrinsically intertwined in 
the achievement of what Ames and Rosemont translated as 
authoritative personhood.
90
 This appears very prominently in 
a number of books in the Analects. In one of them, which 
concerns the very idea of 'authoritative personhood' (or 
benevolence), Tseng-Tu closes the conversation by noting: “A 
gentleman makes friends through being cultivated, but look 
for friends in support of benevolence”. 91  Book I itself is 
                                                                                       
89. In Sandel's view, the lack of constitutive attachments prevents one 
from learning about herself; the lack of alterity, of otherness, impedes 
reflexivity – and so does one's inability to situate her practical choices 
across a spectrum of conceptions of the good that she continuously define 
and revise according to the thickness of her relationships with others. 
Sandel, supra note 59, at 178-183. For Sandel, choices of ends which are 
not grounded on “a relative fixity of character” within the bounds of a 
commonality of constitutive attachments turn out to be arbitrary. Id. 180. 
And so does the self whose every attempt at reflexivity is defeated by the 
lack of alterity. 
90. See supra note 53. 
91.  Analects 12.24 (D.C. Lau translation). 
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famously opened by Confucius in these terms: “Is it not a 
pleasure, having learned something, to try it out at due 
intervals? Is it not a joy to have friends come from afar?”.92 
Both excerpts convey how friendship at the same time 
supports and is enticed by the move towards authoritativeness 
– or sagehood. 
 Ideas such as these are not, as we noted at the outset of 
this chapter, foreign to contemporary liberalism and its 
perception of autonomy as a socially embedded concept. 
Judith deCew makes just such point about autonomy in the 
context of expressive privacy. “Autonomy”, she says, “is 
required for people to be self-expressive.[
93
] But the point of 
such autonomy, understood as successful control over one's 
life and values, is not to disengage one from relations but to 
enhance one's ability to form new and deeper relationships”.94 
Expressive privacy is founded upon such enlarged but largely 
persuasive contemporary understanding of autonomy without 
which the authorship of our lives in contemporary societies is 
not possible. In Ferdinand Schoeman's words, quoted by 
                                                                                       
92.  Analects 1.1 (D.C. Lau translation). 
93. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem introduces a similar view of autonomy 
as freedom in reciprocity in discussing the German idea of informational 
self-determination: "[T]he right to informational self-determination is, 
therefore, not a privatistic defen[c]e right of the individual who opposes 
part of society, but aims to allow each one to participate in communication 
processes. Others [human beings] are the social context in which the limits 
of each one’s personality expand[...]: autonomy, rather than anomie, of the 
individual is the directing image of the Constitution. Autonomy should be 
possible in vital spaces that are socially connected, where freedom of 
communication - or better: common freedom cannot be oriented to a 
limiting concept of protection to egocentric expansion, but should be 
understood as the exercise of freedom in reciprocity. This freedom is not 
to be free of others, but freedom through others”. Wolfgang Hoffmann-
Riem, Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, in DERNEUE DATENSCHUTZ 13 
(Helmut Bäumler org., 1998) (Ger.) cited in Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Jr., 
Erosion of Subjective Rights by Reason of Technical Development, 
Plenary Lecture at the IVR Annual Conference (Aug. 15, 2011) 
(transcripts available at http://goo.gl/9eEfW). 
94. deCew, supra note 82, at 69. 
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deCew, privacy is here “an important value 'largely because of 
how it facilitates associations and relational ties with others, 
not independence from people'”.95 As deCew explains: “we 
are free from the power of the state or society not when we act 
without reference to the attitudes of others, as Mill advocated, 
but when we have diverse social groups available to which we 
can adhere and contribute, and from which we can gain 
support”.96 
 This is a powerful point. The purpose of such 'positive' 
idea of liberty reflected in expressive privacy is not one of 
overreaching by the state or society. Rather, it is one of 
ensuring that individuals will have number and variety of 
reasons for action to choose amongst – and will be able to 
master the channels that constrain the making of such choices. 
This is the essence of the idea of autonomy as supported by 
contemporary liberal theory, represented at its best by the 
thoughts of Joseph Raz.
97
 And the ability to form, revise and 
draw upon our constitutive bonds is, perhaps paradoxically, 
very strong a part of what makes us autonomous. It should not 
be strange to liberalism that the state has a concern with 
laying out the conditions, including the technological ones in 
their necessary degree of depth, that enable us to author our 
lives and interweave it in a larger, and livelier, societal 
tapestry.
98
 
 Stephen Angle has recently pursued similar avenues in 
explaining how human rights are reconcilable with the 
Confucian idea of harmony (hé和).99 There are three aspects I 
would like to briefly highlight in this regard that I believe 
important to our discussion. These are that harmony 
                                                                                       
95. FERDINAND SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) 
cited in deCew, supra note 82, at 69. 
96. Id. at 71. 
97. See generally Raz, supra note 84. 
98. I have enlarged on this point in Marcelo Thompson, In Search of 
Alterity: On Google, Neutrality, and Otherness [forthcoming]. 
99. See Stephen C Angle, Human Rights and Harmony, 30:1 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 76 (2008). 
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presupposes diversity and proportionality, that harmony 
implies an idea of relatedness and constitutive attachment – 
and, finally, that harmony demands a certain propriety of rites 
which requires regulation. These three aspects are perhaps 
uncannily similar to the point we have just made above about 
autonomy. First, as autonomy, harmony presupposes diversity 
and proportionality amongst albeit incommensurable values. 
Angle explains that harmony, not uniformity, is a guideline of 
Confucian thought.
100
 Harmony allows for and demands a 
variety of opinions and criticisms to be expressed and 
presupposes an idea of balance and proportionality in the 
blending of these.
101
 Unlike neutrality, which tends to a 
uniform negative constancy, harmony is dynamic in the 
pursuit of diversity – which also reminds us of how 
foundational for contemporary liberalism the possibility of not 
only adopting but also revising one’s life plans is.102 
                                                                                       
100. Id. at 79. 
101 . “The proportionate blending of the five flavo[u]rs and the 
harmonizing of the five tones by the former kings was done for the 
purpose of setting their minds in balance and bringing perfection to their 
governance”. ZUO ZHUAN, Zhao 20 (522 BC), translated in Scott Bradley 
Cook, Unity and Diversity in Musical Thought of Warring States China 71 
(1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (available 
at University of Michigan Library) cited in Angle, supra note 100, at 86. 
102. See e.g. Raz, supra note 84, at 370-371 ("[T]he ideal of personal 
autonomy is not to be identified with the idea of giving one's life a unity. 
An autonomous person's well-being consists in the successful pursuits of 
self-chosen goals and relationships. ... It does not require an attempt to 
impose any special unity to one's life. The autonomous life may consist of 
diverse and heterogeneous pursuits. And a person who frequently changes 
his tastes can be as autonomous as one who never shakes of his adolescent 
preferences"). See also WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND 
CULTURE 164 (1991) (“The idea of seeing the value of our activities is 
very important. It's crucial to what Rawls calls self-respect, the 'sense that 
one's plan of life is worth carrying out'. Self-respect, as Rawls says, isn't so 
much a part of any rational plan of life, but rather a precondition of it. If 
we thought that our goals in life weren't worth pursuing, then there would 
be not point to our activities. (...) To ensure that we have this self-respect, 
we need freedom to examine our beliefs, to confirm their worth"). 
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 Second, harmony and contemporary conceptions of 
autonomy are based on a requirement of care. As Angle 
explains, “[c]aring is basic to Confucianism and is linked with 
harmony almost from the beginning. Harmony, in a Chinese 
context at least, is not about an abstract balance of inanimate 
objects but about the interactions of life-valuing, generative, 
caring creatures – including the interactions of such creatures 
with their broader, inanimate, or at least nonsapient, 
environment”.103 For Angle, this type of care upon which the 
idea of harmony relies is not incompatible with the moral 
foundations – and indeed the requirements – of international 
human rights. Drawing on Michael Slote’s moral 
philosophy,
104
 Angle advances an idea of a non-aggregative
105
 
balance between different kinds of concern that an individual 
may have with regard to others. These kinds of concern reflect 
the different degrees of depth of our constitutive attachments 
– with intimates, complete strangers or any grade in between 
– and even good individuals will strike a balance between 
these concerns in different ways.
106
 As Angle puts, “[e]xactly 
how we balance will depend on our sense of integrity – that is 
[…] what gives our life a feeling of integrity or wholeness”.107 
If harmony is truly in place, however, if an individual is 
authoring his own life with integrity in the pursuit of a 
balance between the different degrees of care that his personal 
attachments require, it is unlikely that violations to human 
rights will ensue. And as much as harmony and human rights 
are reconcilable around this understanding of care, so are 
harmony and autonomy in a contemporary liberal perspective. 
                                                                                       
103.  Angle, supra note 100, at 85. 
104. See MICHAEL SLOTE, MORALS FROM MOTIVES (2001).  
105 . A non-aggregative balance is one that goes beyond merely 
utilitarian calculus – that is, one which is not satisfied with the idea of 
society being generally better-off (i.e. better off in the aggregate) at 
significant expense to the lives of a limited number of individuals or 
groups.  
106. Angle, supra note 100, at 84. 
107. Id.  
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I have just referred above to Joseph Raz’s understanding on 
the positive duties we owe each other with regard to the 
development of the capacities necessary for authoring our 
lives.
108
 More recently, Yochai Benkler highlighted the need 
for a concern with the “effects that law can have through the 
way it structures the relationships among people with regard 
to the information environment they occupy”.109 Autonomy, 
knowledge and our constitutive attachments stand shoulder to 
shoulder in Benkler's political project. This is so as, for him, 
our possibilities of self-authorship in contemporary societies 
hinge significantly upon the new modalities of collaboration 
and social production that characterize the information 
economy – and that are defined by the structure of the 
information environment.
110
 To the extent that these new 
modalities are hindered, so are we. 
 The third aspect is related to the second. Autonomy 
requires regulation, some form of normative orientation 
towards its valuable dimensions. As Joseph Raz says, 
autonomy is only valuable if it is used towards the good.
111
 
There is here a dimension of cultivation, of propriety that is 
not foreign at all to the Chinese conception of harmony – 
rather, is tantamount to it. What has Confucius to tell us in 
this regard? 
 “Of the things brought about by the rites, harmony is 
the most valuable. Of the ways of the Former Kings, 
this is the most beautiful, and is followed alike in 
matters great and small, yet this will not always work: 
                                                                                       
108. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
109. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 151 (2006). 
110 . Id. at 146 (“The structure of our information environment is 
constitutive of our autonomy, not only functionally significant to it”). 
111 . Raz, supra note 84, at 417 (“[T]the autonomy principle is a 
perfectionist principle. Autonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the 
pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects and relationships. The 
autonomy principle permits and even requires governments to create 
morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones”).  
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to aim always at harmony without regulating it by the 
rites simply because one knows only about harmony 
will not, in fact, work”.112  
Contemporary states, thus, whether in Western or Eastern 
thought, cannot thus embrace neutrality if they are to widen 
our avenues along the way. As D.C. Lau writes in his 
Appendixes to the Mencius, “The Way (...) is not morally 
neutral. It is basic moral principle”.113 Such is the way of the 
information environment and the liberal principles of the 
times we live in – where knowledge, information and our 
relational bonds, our constitutive attachments come together 
so visibly articulated as very central elements of any life 
worth being lived. Learning (xué學) and thinking (sī 思) are 
thus important here not only as a way of cultivation of an 
individualist self in areas that are not the state’s business. 
Ensuring the proper design of the semiotic avenues of the 
information environment is part of the very first thing that 
rulers should do when they take the reins of government – 
“the proper establishment [or rectification] of names” 
(zhèngmíng正名);114 for when names are not correct “speech 
[…] will not flow properly … affairs will not culminate in 
success … rites and music will not flourish … punishments 
will not fit the crime … the common people will not know 
where to put hands and feet”.115  
 
                                                                                       
112. Analects 1.12 (D.C. Lau Translation). 
113 . D.C. Lau, Appendix 5 : On Mencius’ Use of the Method of 
Analogy in Argument to MENCIUS 210 (D.C. Lau trans., Penguin Press 2d 
ed, 2003) (1970) (4
th
 century B.C.E.). [hereinafter Mencius p.# (D.C. Lau 
Translation)]. 
114. I thank Mary Rundle for using the expression in a OECD Working 
Paper we co-authored – and which provided further inspiration for the 
venture in this paper. See Mary Rundle, Marcelo Thompson et al., At a 
Crossroads: Personhood and Digital Identity in the Information Society, 
OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INTUSTRY, 
Working Paper DSTI/DOC(2007)7. 
115. Analects 13.3 translated in Tan, supra note 54, at 71. 
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 The forms through which the proper design of the 
information environment can be ensured are manifold, as 
much as the features of such design may be. Neutrality, 
though, ignores political concern with propriety at any degree 
and thus, paradoxically, the possibility of protecting personal 
autonomy in such a space of social connectedness. It ignores, 
thus, the very values without which the existence of the 
information environment is not even possible. 
 Technological artefacts determine how increasingly 
important parts of our lives unfold; they embed important 
societal and political value-choices. The challenges to liberal 
theory of the past century are many and various and spring 
from the different technological configurations of the 
information environment, in all its dimensions. Beyond 
examples of social networking sites seen above, one can think 
of the ways in which Search Engines determine the relevance 
and morality of what we can and cannot access
116
 – and thus 
have a fundamental, pervasive impact on individual and 
collective practical reason; of how socially managed 
Encyclopaedias have their own political processes, rules with 
fractal levels of detail and real edit wars in the writing of 
entries of much greater societal reach and consequences than 
Encyclopaedias of the past have ever had. 
 One may still insist that all this, if it does invite State 
action, will do for the potential of harms to personal 
autonomy that may ensue from the design of such 
technologies. Such an answer, however, will only reveal how 
                                                                                       
116 . There is a growing literature on the political and otherwise 
normative implications of search engines. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum & 
Lucas Introna, Shapping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines 
Matters, 16(3) THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 169 (2000). See also Oren 
Bracha & Frank Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
1149 (2008); Franq Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential 
Cultural & Political Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 401 (Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus eds., 
2010); and James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007). But see Thompson, supra note 99 suggesting a 
broader perspective for these approaches. 
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far liberalism has evolved in its understandings about the 
range of actions that are capable of restricting the number and 
variety of reasons available for one to author her own life – of 
restricting autonomy, thus. Conversely, it also reveals how 
more tolerant contemporary liberalism has grown about the 
scope of reasons that may be reflected upon by the political 
structure of Western societies, beyond any previous 
orientations of neutrality and insulation of the right from the 
good. 
 The image of the person that springs from such a 
wider understanding of personal autonomy is certainly not 
that of an atomistic person who authors its life unfettered by 
any intervention of the state unless destined to preserve 
individualistic conceptions of liberty and justice. Rather, it is 
the image of a person enveloped by the information 
environment, who expands itself and its spheres of 
relationship through the network of networks, who may have 
its possibilities of authoring its life-plan, individually or in 
common with others, affected by technological interventions 
of many kinds, in very different areas and springing from the 
most diversified sources of power and normativity. 
 In theory, then, liberalism has evolved in the 
information age and redeemed the West from a past of 
exclusion of ideals and conceptions of the good. In thought at 
least, neutrality has been superseded as a core doctrine of 
contemporary political theory. In practice, however, neutrality 
has gained unexplainable force amongst the central regulatory 
principles of the information age – a realm whose properties, 
curiously, render neutrality most unpersuasive. The principle 
of technological neutrality has unfolded, in effect, completely 
disconnected from any normative theorization, and, as we will 
briefly explain in our next, concluding section, it now 
attempts to impinge upon the value systems of Eastern 
societies. Throughout this section, we have noted that the way 
to a more perfect union, to authoritative forms of personhood, 
to benevolence, to humanity, or however we wish to call the 
bonds of self-cultivation that link us together, certainly does 
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not encompass neutrality towards the most defining aspects of 
our age. And yet, at the practical level, once again
117
 we 
witness the attempted exportation of practically and 
theoretically failed institutions to societies that not only would 
be inevitably better off without these
118
 but also, and mostly, 
have the core foundations of their value systems violated by 
such an attempt.  
 The irony here is that contemporary liberalism also has. 
IV. THE NEUTRALIZATION OF HARMONY: CONCLUSION 
 
In April 21, 2006, in his first travel to the United States as the 
President of the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao 
explained to a group of American students assembled at Yale 
University the high place held by harmony in the Chinese 
value system at the same time that he highlighted the 
prospects of any act that goes against China's project of 
building a harmonious society. In Hu's words, 
“[t]he Chinese civilization has always given prominence 
to social harmony, unity and mutual assistance. Back in 
the early days of the Chinese nation, the Chinese 
already advocated that "harmony is most valuable". 
They strove for harmony between man and nature, 
among people and between man's body and soul, and 
yearned for an ideal society where "everyone loves 
everyone else, everyone is equal, and the whole world is 
                                                                                       
117. See, e.g., William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What: 
Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy 
in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 135, 
136 (1997) (arguing that the U.S. intellectual property approach towards 
China "has failed to take adequate account of the legacy of China's past, 
the impact of her current economic, political, and social circumstances, or 
the ways in which a greater respect for this and other important forms of 
legality might be engendered".). 
118. See, generally, HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002) (for an in-
depth historical discussion whose content the title renders most evident). 
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one community". Today, China is endeavo[u]ring to 
build a harmonious society. (…) Any act that promotes 
ethnic harmony and national unity will receive the warm 
welcome and support of the Chinese people. On the 
other hand, any act that undermines China's ethnic 
harmony and national unity will meet their strong 
opposition and resistance”.119 
China's project of development is, of course, not dissociated 
from its own historical and evaluative moment. As President 
Hu also stressed, “China has adopted a new concept of 
development in line with its national conditions and the 
requirement of the times. That is, to pursue a scientific 
outlook on development that makes economic and social 
development people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and 
sustainable”.120 Such orientation towards people with which 
both the ideas of balance and harmony are imbued is very 
different indeed from the ideal of a technology-neutral people-
centric society affirmed in Geneva.
121
 Both paths seem, in 
effect, to be irreconcilable. Harmony does not fit together 
with any flavour of neutrality – and one wonders whether 
people centricity itself does. The path pursued by China is 
thus one that has as a principle the political enframing of 
scientific endeavour rather than an affirmation of 
technological indulgence by the political.
122
 
 
                                                                                       
119 .  Hu Jintao, President, People’s Republic of China, Remarks 
Delivered at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (Apr. 21, 2006), 
BNET.COM : THE CBS INTERACTIVE BUSINESS NETWORK, 
http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/political-transcript-
wire/mi_8167/is_20060421/hu-jintao-delivers-remarks-yale/ai_n50573452. 
120. Id.  
121 . See Geneva Declaration of Principles, supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
122.  See, e.g., YONGNIAN ZHENG, TECHNOLOGICAL EMPOWERMENT: 
THE INTERNET, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN CHINA (2008) (showing how 
technological development in China is part of a longstanding project of 
nation-state building – which, against common wisdom, is also highly 
determined by the participation of social movements). 
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 Of course, to say this is not to proclaim the infallibility 
of China’s model or to endorse the permanence of its current 
contours. The Chinese government itself, I would suspect, 
would not do so. As Daniel A. Bell notes, “[i]n China […] the 
political future is wide open. According to the formulation of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the current system is the 
“primary stage of socialism,” meaning that it's a transitional 
phase to a higher and superior form of socialism”.123 And yet, 
whatever defects China’s current policies for the Internet may 
have, one cannot do away with China’s possibilities of 
harmonizing the architecture of the Internet with the Chinese 
value system and political institutions without doing away 
with the latter altogether.  The imposition of a principle of 
neutrality to China, thus, throws out the baby with the bath 
water. It is a recipe for normative annihilation that contradicts 
the tolerance and pluralism that truly liberal values require. 
 Both the U.S. government and its foremost, state-like 
Internet company – Google –, however, have been pulling the 
international human rights and trade levers to pursue the 
neutralization of China’s technological policies.124 The beliefs 
                                                                                       
123. DANIEL A. BELL, CHINA'S NEW CONFUCIANISM: POLITICS AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 3 (2008).  
124. This not to mention Google’s recent altercation with Beijing and 
sudden move of its search engine from the Mainland China to Hong Kong, 
which mounted a challenge not only to the PRC legal system but also to 
the very idea of “One Country, Two Systems” that preside over the 
relations between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Such a challenge did not 
take off thanks in part to the fact that mainlanders, rather than seeking 
alternative routes to access Google’s search services, continued to further 
their adoption of Baidu, the leading search engine in China. Associated 
Press, China's Baidu quarterly profit up 95 percent, FORBES.COM (Jul. 25, 
2011, 11:47 PM), http://goo.gl/CdkBH ("Baidu's market share has risen to 
75.9 percent from 64 percent in the first quarter of last year before 
Google's closure, according to Analysys International, a research firm in 
Beijing. Google is still China's second-most popular search engine but its 
market share has declined from 30.9 percent to 18.9 percent”). For an 
analysis of Google’s political stances, see Mark Landler, Google Searches 
for a Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at WK4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/weekinreview/28landler.html. 
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underpinning this movement are well described by Wu and 
Goldsmith. They concern an intent of exporting freedom 
expression absolutes in ways that are indeed adverse to ideals 
of tolerance and pluralism. Noting the potential harms of First 
Amendment law to countries that do not embrace the same 
values, the authors say: 
“This point is invariably missed by the critics of gov-
ernment control over the Net, who believe that the U.S. 
First Amendment reflects universal values and is some-
how written into the architecture of the Internet. But the 
First Amendment does not reflect universal values; to 
the contrary, no other nation embraces these values, and 
they are certainly not written into the Internet’s architec-
ture”.125 
Ironically, years after the publication of Wu’s and Goldsmith’s 
influential work, the beliefs the authors referred to seem to 
persist unabated. As suggested by Google in two recent public 
policy documents: 
“Governments that build censorship into networks 
change the architecture and nature of the Internet in 
ways that damage trade and innovation. (…) Trade 
officials and policymakers should be deeply concerned 
about the impact of Internet information restrictions on 
economic growth and trade interests. And, they should 
be ready to use current trade rules and negotiating 
forums to reduce this threat”.126 
                                                                                       
125. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM YU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 156-157 (2006). 
126. Google, White Paper: Enabling Trade in the Era of Information 
Technologies: Breaking Down Barriers to the Free Flow of Information 
(Nov. 15, 2010), available at 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/11/promoting-free-trade-for-
internet.html; Reply Comments of Google Inc. at 9, Notice of Inquiry on 
the Global Free Flow of Information on the Internet Docket No. 
100921457-0457-0 (Dec. 06, 2010), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/comments/100921457-0457-
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What should we understand by censorship? “Anything that 
differs from the First Amendment and its entrenchment in the 
network architecture” would be as inoperable an answer as to 
define censorship as “the opposite of neutrality”. Both render 
it impossible that we even try to earnestly engage with the 
question. For how can countries come together to define the 
acceptable boundaries of speech if the starting point is that no 
such boundaries should exist? In effect, the idea that the 
Internet should embed no defining characteristic but a 
morality of absolute freedom is, borrowing Charles Taylor’s 
words, a “dream […] doomed to self-destruction”.127 
 Technological neutrality, however, reflects a morality 
of precisely such a sort, by preventing the state from 
specifically engaging with the defining properties of 
technological artefacts – and thus by deferring to however 
wanting reasons technological designers may embrace. It 
would prevent China from making particular choices with 
regard to its territorial Internet, thus hindering China’s 
aspiration of promoting the pursuit of a people-oriented 
scientific outlook – and overall undermining China’s nation-
building project.  
 In the realm of trade, technological neutrality would 
mean that China cannot restrict the trade of online goods and 
services in ways that it does not restrict the trade of offline 
ones. The principle in this sense resembles what in Part I we 
had called the non-discrimination principle. But here as well 
the idea of non-discrimination invites further definition of its 
meaning. That is, how should China go about in avoiding 
discrimination? How far can it go in describing the properties 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
01/attachments/Commerce 
FreeExpressionNOI.pdf. [emphasis added] 
127. "Now this dream of absolute freedom is impossible; and we have 
seen that the root reason is this, that it does not recognize an independent 
significant reality outside of its own will, and hence is doomed to self-
destruction”. CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 185 (1977).  
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of technological artefacts?
128
  It is indeed only in a more 
abstract form, as a general non-discrimination ideal that 
technological neutrality appears in the international trade 
system – or, better, as the attempt to impose such an ideal, for 
technological neutrality is yet to be recognized in a definite 
way by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World 
Trade Organization. 
 In China – Audiovisual, the United States pushed 
forward the proposition that the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services
129
 “does not contain any provisions that 
distinguish between the different technological means through 
which a service may be supplied”. 130  At stake would be 
China’s possibilities of establishing restrictions for the 
distribution of sound recordings through electronic means. In 
its Schedule of Commitments under the GATS, China had 
committed to liberalize “Videos … distribution services” and 
“Sound recording distribution services”. The question would 
thus be whether those commitments should be read as also 
                                                                                       
128. A specific agreement of the world trade system – the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade – could provide us with some clues. In a 
wording in all similar to what in Part I we had called the vagueness 
principle, art. 2.8 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
commands: “2.8. Wherever appropriate, Members shall specify technical 
regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance rather 
than design or descriptive characteristics”. Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 2.8, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No.  9616 
[hereinafter TBT]. Notice that what the TBT requires here is that technical 
regulations be framed only in terms of what technological artefacts 
perform – i.e. their functions – instead of describing the characteristics of 
technological artefacts themselves. However, while we can understand the 
vagueness principle as the more precise formulation of technological 
neutrality, in the context of the world trade system technological neutrality 
has appeared so far in a more abstract form, simply as a general non-
discrimination rule. 
129. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
130. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distributional Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Products, ¶ 88, WT/DS363/AB/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter China-
Audiovisual Appellate Body Report]. 
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encompassing the performance of distribution services 
through electronic means. China sought to make the point that 
the word “distribution” should be restricted to physical means 
– which would thus enable it to establish differentiated rules 
for electronic services. 
 The conclusion reached by the Panel
131
 was that 
“electronic distribution of sound recordings was technically 
feasible and a commercial reality as early as 1998 and, in any 
case, before China's accession to the WTO in December 
2001”. 132  This, together with a number of other reasons 
related to the context of China’s commitments and object and 
purpose
133
 of the GATS,
134
 led the Panel to conclude that 
                                                                                       
131. References to the Panel Report hereinafter imply that this has not 
been modified by the Appellate Body Report in the specific aspects 
referred to. 
132 . Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distributional Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Products, 
¶ I:1247, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter China-Audiovisual 
Panel Report].  
133. These interpretive criteria are laid out in art. 31 of the Vienna 
Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 
art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). 
134. From a genuinely contextual perspective there was nothing absurd 
in China’s claims. Besides a number of other issues that were raised by 
China in its defence, one can see that, in 1996, shortly after the GATS was 
adopted (in 1994), the Diplomatic Conference that adopted the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty also agreed on a 
number of interpretive Statements on that treaty, amongst which was one 
concerning the so-called right of distribution: “Agreed statements 
concerning Articles 6 and 7: As used in these Articles, the expressions 
“copies” and “original and copies,” being subject to the right of 
distribution and the right of rental under the said Articles, refer exclusively 
to fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects”. This 
argument was not examined in this shape by either the Panel that heard the 
case in the WTO or the Appellate Body. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 
20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/94dc. pdf 
[herinafter WCT]. See also Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, statement concerning art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/96 (published Dec. 23, 1996), available at 
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electronic distribution services could be read as part of 
China’s commitment.135 In understanding that China’s GATS 
schedule specifically encompasses the electronic distribution 
of audiovisual products, however, the Panel did not need to 
address the issue of whether, if China’s original commitments 
did not happen to cover the electronic equivalent of a service 
committed for performance through tangible means, a 
principle of technological neutrality would demand extension 
of the same commitments by analogy. 
 China’s resistance to technological neutrality in the 
case was grounded, on the one hand, on the lack of final 
recognition of the principle by the DSB and, on the other hand, 
on the very pertinent argument that there are important 
differences between what it called “network music services” 
and the “sound recording distribution” services it had 
originally committed in its Schedule.
136
 China suggested a 
number of factors for interpreting these differences, which the 
Panel understood as of limited value since no source of 
authority was provided for them by China and also because 
they would not necessarily lead to unambiguous results. But 
neither did the Panel agree on the matter of technological 
neutrality. Rather, it observed: 
“We note […] that in interpreting China's commitment 
on "sound recording distribution services", we have no 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/ 
trtdocs_wo033.pdf. 
135. Such was a rather dynamic
 
understanding of a term – distribution 
– that, with regard to the same type of intellectual works, the parties to the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, a somewhat established international framework. 
See Tim Wu, The World Trade Law of Censorship and Internet Filtering, 7 
CHI. J. INT'L L. 264, 271-273 (2007) (noting WTO’s DSB overall tendency 
to give a dynamic interpretation to members’ schedules of commitments 
under GATS). The WCT currently counts 89 contracting parties, including 
the United States and China. See Contracting Parties, WIPO.INT, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_
year=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=16 (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2011). 
136.  Panel Report,  supra note 132, at ¶ I:1250. 
2011] THE NEUTRALIZATION OF HARMONY 55 
 
 
need to invoke a principle of technological neutrality. 
We have already found that the core meaning of China's 
commitment on these services includes the distribution 
of audio content on non-physical media”.137 
The development of an always-on, mobile Internet, however, 
in which services are rendered over the cloud and do not 
encompass the distribution of copies, will give China’s 
arguments on “network music services” renewed importance. 
Together with other issues concerning the regulation of 
Internet services in rubrics that cannot be precisely 
encompassed under China’s GATS commitments, the 
transformation of files and copies into overall “experiences” 
will at some point prompt the WTO to specifically consider 
the problem of technological neutrality as raised in China–
Audiovisual – in particular given the U.S. and the E.U. 
keenness on moving this agenda forward. 
 China must pitch its defence higher. It must establish 
that the recognition of technological neutrality by the WTO 
would be tantamount to recognizing that virtually the entirety 
of China’s regulatory framework for the Internet infringes 
China’s commitments under the GATS, that China’s nation-
building project itself does so. Internet-related technologies 
pose challenges to the Chinese regime that are 
paradigmatically different from those posed by earlier 
technological kinds. China needs to address these challenges 
in accordance with its system of values. It does need to 
harmonize the design of technological artefacts with those 
reasons that are inherent to its political system, with the basic 
structure of its society. To require China to ground all of its 
Internet-specific regulations on public morals or public order 
defences
138
 would be to transform China's political system as 
                                                                                       
137. Id. at I:1263. 
138. Article XIV(a) of the GATS defines that measures necessary for 
the protection of public morals or maintenance of public order are 
exceptions to the obligations contained in the Agreement. Though an 
earlier case saw the United States having its exceptions to some extent 
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a whole in an exception. China could not have committed to 
such an enterprise. To read it as having done so would be an 
act of political violence. 
 But, as the earlier sections of this paper have argued, 
that would be an act of political violence not only against the 
Chinese regime. In a world of technological erring, liberal 
states themselves would be precluded from ensuring that the 
technological infrastructure enables the pursuit of valuable 
options. They will not be able to rectify misspoken words in 
the informational foundations upon which people build their 
lives. Some may welcome such a sight. Some may wish to 
uproot liberalism from the more fecund soils on which it has 
finally settled. Amongst these, the most superficial may think 
that any project of political correctness is inherently adverse 
to the very foundations of Western philosophy. But if we go 
back to the sources, we see that “[t]o Socrates, as to 
Confucius, correct language, the rectification of names, was 
the prerequisite for correct living and even efficient 
government”.139 As Socrates remarked in Phaedo, “You may 
be sure, dear Crito, that inaccurate language is not only in 
itself a mistake: it implants evil in men's souls”.140 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
legitimized by the DSB, the same did not happen in China—Audiovisual, 
since the Panel did not find that China’s measures were even necessary 
and thus did not engage in the evaluation of the substantive merits of 
China’s public morals and public order defences. At stake here was the 
interpretation of Art. XX(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which however has an identical wording to Art. XIV(a) of the 
GATS. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 
art. XX(a), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187; 33 I.L.M. 1153(1994). For the earlier 
United States case concerning public morals and public order exceptions, 
see Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 323, WT/DS285/AB/R 
(Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter United States—Gambling]. 
139. W. K. C. GUTHRIE, THE SOPHISTS 276 (1971) cited in Warren E. 
Steinkraus, Socrates, Confucius, and  the  Rectification of Names, 30:2 
PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST 261. 
140. Plato, Phaedo 115e (trans. R.S. Bluck) cited in W. K. C. GUTHRIE, 
SOCRATES 168 n (1971). 
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 In a recent article, Anupam Chander defended 
forbearance and the pursuit of agreed international standards 
as forms of harmonization necessary for the flourishing of 
international trade though what he called the “electronic silk 
road”. For Chander, harmonization is necessary as a form of 
freeing trade in the information environment from a threat of 
Balkanization — “the creation of borders in cyberspace, 
thereby risking the advantages of global information and 
services sharing”.141 In his words: 
“This willingness to forbear in the interests of comity 
and the international order will prove essential with 
respect to services as well. The risks of Balkanization, 
the incursions upon foreign sovereignty, and the costs 
of compliance with multifarious and potentially con-
flicting municipal laws all counsel restraint”.142 
While restraint is certainly also an important virtue within the 
Confucian philosophical project,
143
 it is so in the sense of self-
cultivation, of regulation by the rites.
144
 It is restraint in pur-
suit of authoritativeness, benevolence – shù (恕) as the meth-
od of rén (仁). The modality of restraint that Chander advo-
cates seems more conducive to neutrality than to harmony. It 
is no surprise, thus, that the author also advocates technologi-
cal neutrality as a value that should guide the development of 
international trade.
145
 
 
                                                                                       
141. Chander, supra note 8, at 318. 
142. Id. at 322. 
143. "One should keep glib talkers (ningren 佞人) at a distance, for 
"clever words undermine excellence," and "glib-tongued talkers bring 
down states and families" (Analects 15.11, 15.27, 17.18)”. Tan, supra note 
53, at 179. 
144. “The Master said, ‘Do not look unless it is in accordance with the 
rites; do not listen unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not speak 
unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not move unless it is in 
accordance with the rites.’”. Analects, 12.1 (D.C. Lau translation).  
145. Chander, id. at 302-305.  
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More than a principle of restraint, however, technolog-
ical neutrality is a principle of deference. It asks not only that 
states seek to regulate their own conduct in accordance with 
rules of propriety and in respect to rights and principles that 
the international community strives to agree upon. It rather 
assumes the absolute fallibility of international institutions, 
their incapacity to come together and solve important norma-
tive perplexities concerning some of the greatest problems of 
our time. In doing so, technological neutrality subjects the in-
ternational community to the will of those states and corpora-
tions who hold the technological stakes of an age. Applied to 
the reality of the information environment, it takes it to be a 
principle that we should ignore a change of paradigms that 
has completely redefined the world we now live in.
146
 But 
how can we? How can we assume that those who blow the 
conches through which the notes of our future resound, who 
write the formulae that determine the constitution of our soci-
eties should do so without any normative boundaries specific 
to their endeavours? Above all, how can we reconcile liberty 
and harmony through an ideal of political annihilation? We 
must do better in finding our Way. 
                                                                                       
146 . Even if the idea of non-discrimination meant that we must 
assimilate the effects of Internet-related technologies to those of 
technologies conceived within an older social paradigm, that would still 
leave unanswered the question of why we should ignore the specific 
challenges and opportunities that the information environment presents us 
with; of why we should not pursue an ideal of harmony between these and 
the broader social values that we care about – of course not anew, but with 
a fresh heart. 
